

Social Order

SOCIALISM
REVISITED

William F. Kennedy

May 1961

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Pragmatics of Economic Development

Richard J. Ward

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American Indian Crisis

Robert A. White

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The Way It Was

Richard L.- G. Deverall

BOOKS • LETTERS • COMMENT

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Social Order

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Members of the Institute of Social Order: Leo C. Brown, *Director*, Edward Duff, *Editor of SOCIAL ORDER*, David C. Bayne, Joseph M. Becker, Paul P. Harbrecht, John L. Thomas.

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. . . just a few things

ACCEPTING AN INVITATION to participate at the annual convention of a national Catholic organization, the writer has reconciled himself to the prospect of deeply-moving exhortations and a spate of strongly-worded resolutions. The type of exhortations will probably parallel in conviction (and sincerity) the words Father John P. Delaney, S.J., first Director of the Institute of Social Order, used to relish, quoting Pope Pius XII:

I can and do write encyclicals. I can speak over the radio. I can write about social doctrine but I cannot go into the factories, into the shops, into the offices, into the mines . . . nor can the Bishops do this, nor priests, for these places are closed to them. There, the Church needs thousands and thousands of militant lay missionaries . . . who are representative of the Church in their working environment.

Roma locuta est.

The resolutions will undoubtedly largely concern themselves with the impact of Christian principles in our contemporary society. Their scope will at least rival that indicated in a news story announcing last year's "Church and Economic Life Week" of the National Council of Churches:

This year the event will start a year-long congregational study of "key problems" in the economic life of this country. Topics will include the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the moral aspects of inflation, employment of women, rural and urban workers and the churches' own economic and employment practices.

Quite an ambitious program. So are the resolutions that come out of conventions of Catholic organizations.

The bothersome question arises: where is the evidence of the requisite

study preceding these resolutions, what is the assurance that the application of our shining principles to the complexities of local community life will be thought through? (For one assumes that exhortations are not meant merely to indulge the emotions nor that resolutions are adopted merely to table a topic of public concern.) Goodwill and generosity are noble virtues; they need to be supported by an alert and industrious intelligence, if our programs are to have consistency and penetration and permanent effect. "It is not enough to have more and louder Voice of America facilities, if they are not saying the adroit thing," John Foster Dulles once remarked.

Saying the adroit thing supposes an understanding of the dominant culture into which Catholics are emerging, not as a tolerated but as an accepted minority. It supposes, further, a deeper understanding of how our specifically religious values relate to, are influenced by, and can shape that culture. It supposes reflection which, in turn, supposes serious reading.

In the context of the federal school aid bills the Most Reverend Lawrence J. Shehan of Bridgeport summoned his people to act "promptly, vigorously and with decision" in explaining Catholic claims against "the national superstition" that only the public schools serve a civic purpose. His Excellency listed three factors essential to the success of such an effort:

1. Convincing Congress of the justice of our cause.
2. Showing Congress that what we ask is not only just but also in accord with the Constitution.
3. Awakening our

people to the injustice of being excluded and to the need of communicating their convictions and their desires to their Senators and Representatives in Congress.

It is easy enough, one supposes, on episcopal orders to stir Catholic parents to a letter writing campaign of protest against the discrimination in dispensing for a common purpose federal funds to only a determined group of federal citizens. It is more difficult in a moment of crisis to inculcate an understanding of the provisions of the Constitution so that Catholic parents can articulate "the justice of our cause." (After all, President Kennedy declared, even before announcing his candidacy, his belief that federal aid to parochial schools is unconstitutional and the head of NCWC's Department of Education assured Catholic Congressmen that they were free to follow their consciences in voting against such aid.) The question is: what proportion of the Catholic community (or of American citizens generally, for that matter) knows what the First Amendment says. The writer recalls a Catholic physician of Bishop Shehan's diocese, a man noted for his extensive charities and at no small personal effort, railing against "socialized medicine," his description of a national health insurance measure then before Congress. The doctor did not know the names of the sponsors of the bill, could not name his Representative in Congress, could not even identify both Senators from his State.

Doctors, of course, are busy men. So are the zealous members of Catholic organizations who annually pledge themselves to "consecrate the world to Christ" (as the Holy Father urged them to do) in the most concrete fashions. Are they too busy to read seriously and thus to study the implications of their

resolutions? Most Americans seem to have an aversion to books. A survey reveals that

25 per cent of college graduates say they have not read one book in the year just past; only 17 per cent of adults, at any time, are reading a book; only 12 per cent of the houses being constructed will have built-in bookcases at all; only 13 per cent of Americans borrow books from the public libraries and, according to the judgment of the librarians, only five per cent of these are good reading, seven per cent are of fair quality and 88 per cent are of low quality.

It is this kind of intellectual slackness that moved the editor of *The Sign* to protest that today "we're breeding a new type of human being—a guy with a full belly, an empty mind and a hollow heart."

There is among Catholics a feeling that the religious enterprise is essentially an affair of the will, of grace strengthening our moral determination. But grace also illumines the mind, not normally by sudden inspiration but by perfecting the intelligence addressing itself—as God intended that it should—to a deeper study of His purposes at work in the world.

With pardonable self-interest of a publisher, Frank Sheed has complained of the perversity of Catholics in their choice of heroism. Should there be prospect of persecution, they are confident of their courage to face the tyrant's lash. Not so prompt are they in the current need of the Church in the United States in 1961: to shelve solutions by slogan and to exercise their minds in finding the Christian sense of meaningful living in our day. When a pin is required, what is offered is a piano or a telephone pole, more impressive offerings, perhaps, but not wholly apposite for our present needs.

EDWARD DUFF, S.J.

THE WAY IT WAS

RICHARD L.-G. DEVERALL

SOMETIME AGO I read an article by my old friend of 1930 *Catholic Worker* days—John Cort—in which he politely but firmly rebuked another dear friend—the Editor of *SOCIAL ORDER*—for taking the position that primarily not economic but rather social problems confront Catholic social action in the United States. First, I do not really think Fr. Duff has ever said that; and, second, many of the problems of the 1930s *have* been solved—far more than we realize. As I have lived outside the USA since 1943 and remember only FDR as our last President, I can recall accurately and contrast more historically the situation John Cort and I faced 30 years ago with contemporary American problems as I examine them on regular visits home.

Certainly, the election of Jack Kennedy as our 35th President has rocked me as nothing has in years. Rather, not in decades. For the election of Jack Kennedy has proved that during the past three decades the United States has undergone a revolution equal in importance to the War for Independence and the travail that produced the Constitution of the United States.

In 1926, I believe, I sought my first

job. I came in from Brooklyn, where we lived, to Manhattan. At a large bank, the lady behind the desk sat me down, handed me an application for employment, and I began to write while she watched me. When I reached the item, "Religion?.....," I got as far as writing "Roman . . ." when she said abruptly: "Might as well stop right there!" I couldn't understand it and was all the more shocked when my mother explained that Catholics had a rough time finding a job because of "prejudice." I still can't understand why prejudice exists in so many of us but the election of John F. Kennedy, among other things, is a monumental epic in the history of America, marking as it does the end of the ancient assumption that no Catholic need apply for the highest office in the land.

1926 was a time when it was taken for granted that white, Anglo-Saxon, male Protestants ran the United States;

The author, at present Special Assist. to the Assistant General Secretary of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, has participated actively in Catholic social action for three decades. He will relate his experiences in several installments.

and most of them, at that, were Freemasons. Al Smith later ran for the Presidency and I well remember the burning crosses and again our question: "But why do they *bate* Governor Smith?"

To begin with the beginning, I was born in Brooklyn in 1911 under the sign of Justice, a happy one. Educated in both parochial and public schools, I was lucky to have as playmates not only immigrant children but also Negroes and Jews. As children we attended Sunday Mass at St. Peter Claver's church in Brooklyn. We went to junior high school where many of the students were native Americans (sic) and the rest were Micks, Spics, Wops, Niggers and Mackerel Snappers. The Polaks were just coming into their own and the Jews were still called Kikes and Sheenies.



America in the middle 1920s had become a veritable hothouse of optimism, exulting in the assumption of unending economic prosperity promised by Harding, Coolidge and then Herbert Hoover. The Republican pundits, economic and political, preached the uncorrected gospel of "rugged individualism" and even the Catholics took it for granted, with Calvinist faith, that the good man got

a job and went up the ladder of success. Obviously, only the dissolute and the lazy lived in poverty.

I was taught that what made a man was a clean and neatly pressed suit, a "proper" hat and tie, shined shoes and clean fingernails. In time I became aware of the fact that the worst crook in the country could get away with it provided he got the money "legitimately" and that he endowed an Opera House or gave generously to whatever church he attended. The 1920s were days when no Catholic church was disturbed by the mention of the radical notions of "social justice" found in the encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, issued by Pope Leo XIII on May 15, 1891 and virtually buried on sight. If any Catholic had gone to confession in 1926 to confess to the sin of racial discrimination, the good Father would probably have given him a lecture on scrupulosity and then asked: "Anything else?" The Protestant churches were patronized by the good, the wise and the able; and the Catholic churches still suffered from a minority complex, the attacks of the Ku Klux Klan and the overwhelming and choking bourgeois capitalist atmosphere of the times. The Catholics were busy building churches and schools, holding fairs and bazaars, and otherwise raking in the money as fast as they could. And all this for the most worthy purposes, mind you. Yet the Church of that period found no time to encourage the trade unions advocated by Leo XIII. As a young boy in the office of Owen D. Young of General Electric, anyone who mentioned the word "union" was regarded as a raving Bolshevik or an anarchist. (No one knew what an anarchist was but the Hearst newspapers pictured

them as nasty, old, bearded men, holding huge bombs with spluttering fuses.) Later, when I transferred to the Wat-
tessing Avenue Plant of General Electric as a machinist apprentice, the word "union" was said only in the privacy of the toilet; and if it was known that one talked about it, one was jolly well fired. Indeed, the struggling American Federation of Labor, largely officered by Catholics, had taken a beating after World War I, for the bourgeois capitalist atmosphere and the fantastic (if illusory) prosperity led to a vast loss of membership and belief.

When the crash came in 1929, the pastors and curates I heard preach acted as if they never heard of unemployment. There were the same sermons on purity, on right living, on joining the Holy Name Society and on every subject except the most vital subject of the day: finding a job, securing social justice, supporting a family in frugal comfort. I remember the bitter comments of many of the middle-aged Catholic men who were struggling to pay their rent and buy potatoes. "Doesn't Father realize I've been out of work for two years," they would ask angrily after hearing a long sermon on stinginess and why everyone should join the Dollar-a-Sunday Club. Hungry and homeless men roamed the streets of many areas, cursing the closed doors of the churches, for (like Mary and Joseph) they couldn't find room for sleeping, even in the cold of stone-walled churches.

Oh yes. There had been Cardinal Gibbons who had defended the worker; there had been Father Peter E. Dietz and his Legion of Justice; and there was the "socialist" priest in Washington, that "upstart" Father John Au-

gustine Ryan. But the parish clergy we knew in those days went their rounds, visited the sick, played golf, had a decent car and didn't go too hungry while their flocks were scraping the barren sides of the Great Depression. Looking back at it, it was a dangerous time for the Church and the wonder is that there wasn't more anticlericalism abroad.



Getting a white collar job, dressing "decently" and playing miniature golf remain in my mind as the symbols of the 1920s, an unreal period in American history if there ever was one. For the Church this decade had opened with the historical 1919 Bishops' Statement advocating advanced social legislation and the social control of the American economy in the interests of social justice. The Bishops' Statement was hastily buried; one had the clear impression that the local parish priest spent more time on the golf links than he did in studying social problems.

And the typical lay Catholic was as much a bourgeois capitalist as were some members of the clergy. Then there was only one goal: money. And the only rule was to get it without being caught. As the stock market went up and up and Hoover promised two chickens in every pot and two cars in every garage, the American people—the Catholics included—flocked to worship before the Golden Calf. I think I bought my first share of stock

at the age of 16 and, typical of the times, it was on the installment plan. All I knew was that one bought the little pieces of paper and in a year or two you doubled your money. Where the "profit" came from was no problem; it was a legal way to gamble safely (or so we thought). At the same age I began to smoke cigars (cigarettes were for the dirty workers!) and dream the same dreams of the young bourgeois capitalists who were then the teen-agers of America. If there was any problem for the teen-ager, it was to find a "safe" speakeasy where one could buy non-needed beer (the "needled" stuff made you sick) or whisky that didn't turn you blind. I had been impressed when one of my uncles went blind one Christmas after a bit of methyated "gin."

It was a mad age, a crazy period, and a virtually non-Christian or anti-Christian era. If ever America needed the New Testament and Christ, it was in the 1920s. They got stock booms and miniature golf instead.

During this period a young member of the Congregation of St. Basil, the Reverend Charles E. Coughlin, had been working at Assumption College in Windsor, Ontario, Canada. He had made himself felt as a dramatic coach and as a priest with a definite flair for impressive oratory, made all the more colorful by his rich and almost deliberate brogue. At a time when the Rule of the Congregation was being changed, the Basilians had the opportunity to opt out or remain. Father Coughlin left when Bishop Gallagher of the Detroit Diocese adopted him.

In 1926, still a young man and pastor of a small parish in Royal Oak, then a small and new suburb of indus-

trial Detroit, Father Coughlin secured time on the air and within a matter of a few years people all over the nation tuned in at 4 o'clock every Sunday afternoon to hear the rich brogue come to them from the altar of Father Coughlin's Shrine of the Little Flower.



After October 29, 1929 and the fantastic crash of the American capitalist system, Father Coughlin became the voice crying in the wilderness, the voice of a social prophet bringing to America, in homely terms, the social gospel. The name of St. Thomas Aquinas—"Thomas of Aquin" as Father Coughlin loved to roll out the name of this great Doctor of the Church—St. Thomas and his teachings on the just wage, justice, and the economic and social crimes which cry to Heaven for vengeance came to us teen-agers as we sat on the floor in front of the radio to listen to what then seemed to be revolutionary doctrines. Father Coughlin castigated the bankers (some of whom were then committing suicide by jumping out of windows) and properly deplored the very real fact that in the 1920s the American people had deserted the God of Jacob and Isaac to follow the priests of the high temples of finance.

People today have no idea of Father Coughlin's impact in awakening the social conscience of America. It should

also be remembered that his most generous and loyal supporters included the hundreds of thousands of Jewish people who tuned in on the Hour of the Little Flower, moved as they were by the historic and deep hunger of the Jew for justice. The Jews were drawn to Father Coughlin as were hundreds of thousands of Protestants and Catholics. And these Jews gave generously!

It was at this juncture that Pope Pius XI, of most happy memory, chose to issue the memorable encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno* commemorating the 40th anniversary of the still-forgotten encyclical *Rerum Novarum* of Leo XIII. I have read in the recent *The Politics of Upheaval* by my friend Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., his account of the rise of Father Coughlin. It is a prejudiced account. No one person in the United States took the Papal documents and shook the Americans into their senses, into a realization that religion is not a button put on once every Sunday but a vital way of life, a faith and a code of morality which must be lived 24 hours a day, seven days a week, as did Father Coughlin. He thundered at the evil of underproduction while human beings starved. He hammered at the Republican Party, at President Herbert Hoover, at the classic doctrines of liberalism and the Manchester school which had helped bring America to its knees and capitalism to its doom. People who had been playing miniature golf and buying up to their necks on the installment plan now began to talk about Adam Smith, rugged individualism, capitalism and all the rest of what Father Coughlin had to say. I recall that every Monday morning, in the office or in the factory, the main subject of

conversation was what Father Coughlin had said the previous afternoon.

That Father Coughlin left the path and entered strange and unfortunate pastures later on can never change the fact that it was he who awakened the social conscience not only of his own Church but of America. Franklin Delano Roosevelt had no greater precursor than the Canadian priest speaking every Sunday from Royal Oak.

Father Coughlin was the first. Others would follow.

Father Coughlin's preachments and stirring calls to battle for social justice and a new deal in America affected me deeply. It was the depth of depression. Four of my molars, the only teeth I have lost as of 50 years of age, all fell out, rotten, during the last year of the regime of Herbert Hoover. I was then a youngster living in Brooklyn and moving with a set of girls and boys who were somewhat serious; we founded a weekly debating society, "the Agora," which became more radical as more of us lost our jobs and had no money. By 1932 I was reading the *Daily Worker* and the *Socialist Call*, for to my young mind they complemented what Father Coughlin said on Sunday. The Radio Priest was denouncing and calling for action but he had no specific program other than change. The *Call* and the *Worker* seemed to give us an answer: the Five Year Plan of Russia, a society free of exploitation of man by man, no unemployment, and industrial production for use, not for profit.

By then I was a dishwasher in a chemical factory and a part-time chemical engineering student at Columbia University. I marched in every May Day parade and sought out almost

every picket line or Union Square riot that took place in New York City. In my English class, since I was bringing in proletarian poems about St. Francis and Marx, Union Square and Christ, my professor at Columbia turned me into a one-man show for the class. The more radical I became, the more I got an "A" and the request, "Read this one to the class." Finally, one of the rich boys protested that the teacher was using me to make Communists and my papers were thereafter not read as often.

Hoover faced the elections. These were the days when I was planning with a Brooklyn friend how to dynamite the Brooklyn Bridge to make Hoover realize we didn't like him; the days when all of my letters to members of our society ended with the quite respectable (among that generation) "Yours for the Revolution . . . !" In 1932 I registered as a Socialist in the small town in which we lived outside Newark, New Jersey; to my surprise, the local weekly newspaper came out with a headline that there was one registered Socialist Party member on the books! It didn't bother me; and I voted for Norman Thomas rather than Franklin Delano Roosevelt who, I felt, was only trying to save the capitalist system and therefore would betray the "revolution."

They were wonderful days! Weren't they, John Cort?

It was just about this time that I first met Peter Maurin and Dorothy Day. I think it was my Professor of History at Columbia, Carlton J. H. Hayes, who recommended me to Dorothy. But of that and the emergence of the Catholic social movement of the 1930s, there will be more in the next installment.

For the Catholic Viewpoint on race relations

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AMERICAN INDIAN CRISIS

ROBERT A. WHITE, S.J.

A FEW MONTHS AGO, I was visiting with the owner of a general store on the great Sioux reservation of South Dakota. The scene at this store on the wind-swept prairies of the Dakotas was symbolic. Out front the menfolk, their bronze faces passive under wide-brimmed western hats, leaned against the frame building, idly conversing in the guttural staccato of the Lakota dialect. Inside, their beshawled wives were eyeing the canned goods stacked on shelves around the walls and quietly calculating whether their last welfare or lease check could be stretched until the arrival of the next one. The store owner spoke softly across the counter about the situation on the reservation, drawing from a lifetime of dealings with these Indian families. "Yes," he finally remarked, "I have never known the Sioux people so poor as they are these days. Nothing keeps this store open now but monthly welfare checks."

Concretely before my eyes, the crisis of the American Indian was being lived out: idle men, poverty, dependence on welfare, aimless lives. At the heart of this crisis is the story of an ever increasing reservation population trying to eke out a living on ever diminishing reservation resources.

In 1900, after more than a century of warfare, epidemics, and migration, there were only 250,000 American Indians living on their meager reservations. Sixty years later the Indian population has soared to 535,000 with 360,000 receiving at least some kind of special services from the United States government; about 275,000 Indians are crowded on the reservations. Furthermore, Indians on the reservations have a birth rate approximately 50 per cent higher than for all races in the United States; it is a further fact that, because so much of the Indian population is composed of younger people, its death rate is actually lower than that of the general population. The American Indians are now one of the fastest growing minority groups in the country.

This dramatic change in the vital statistics of the Indian has been brought about in part by a recent concerted drive promoting preventative medicine on the reservation. For the period 1954-1957 alone the Indian death rate from tuberculosis dropped 40.5 per cent; the death rate from gastro-enteric diseases, 31 per cent. From 1953 to 1957 infant

Much of the research for this article was done at the Pine Ridge Reservation, South Dakota. The writer is now at St. Mary's College, St. Marys, Kansas.

mortality among Indians declined by 26 per cent. Today, 24 per cent of all Indian deaths still occur before the age of one, as compared with 7 per cent for the general United States population. But with the enactment of the Indian Sanitation Act in 1959 another drop in infant mortality is expected.

At the very time that the Indian population on the reservations is multiplying, Indian land is constantly passing into the hands of white landowners. This loss of Indian land means economic tragedy for many reservation families because a great part of their current support comes from the grazing, timber and mineral resources of their inherited land.

THE problem of dissipation of Indian land has its roots in the shortsighted government policy of the 1880s and 1890s. Early in the 19th century, when it became apparent that Indian landowners were an easy prey for land-hungry whites, the United States government held Indian land in trust until the Indian should be competent to manage his own property. Nevertheless, about 1880, in order to hurry the Indian on to competency and assimilation into the American culture, it was decided to split up the tribally-held reservations into small farming and grazing units. The proponents of this plan hoped that by giving each adult Indian a 160 acre plot he would quickly become the operator of an individual farming enterprise. The Indian tribes objected strenuously yet in 1887 Congress passed the Allotment Act. Actually, reservations were allotted only in Oklahoma, the Lake States and the Plains States. Much of the reservation lands of the Pacific Coast States and nearly all of the Indian lands of the Southwest remained in the collective

possession of the tribes.

The Indian owner of an allotment could not dispose of his land at this time because it was still kept in trust, free of property taxes, by the government. The Indian owner could secure a fee patent (full title to his land) only by a special process of proving his competency. Frequently fee patents were issued indiscriminately, however, and at one period they were actually forced on Indian owners. Thus, the alienation of allotted Indian land began almost immediately; individual Indians had their land removed from trust status and then sold or lost these holdings. Between 1887 and 1934 Indian holdings decreased from 130 million acres to 50 million acres.

The loss of Indian land continued at such an alarming rate that in 1933 issuance of fee patents was practically stopped by order of the Secretary of the Interior. In 1934, as part of the Indian Reorganization Act effecting a general change in Indian policy, allotment of Indian land was stopped. During the 1930s and the early 1940s the Bureau of Indian Affairs strongly discouraged individual Indian landowners from selling their holdings and permitted sales only to other Indian individuals or to the tribal organizations.

Land lost

However, in 1948, by act of Congress, the Secretary of the Interior was authorized to sell individual Indian lands. Indian landowners were also authorized to go directly to Congress for individual legislation which gave them patents in fee to their land and allowed them to sell on the open market for the highest price. Many Indian families were facing acute poverty in the postwar years and, as land prices rose, they began converting their land


holdings into ready cash. The sale of Indian trust land was increasing at such a rapid rate that in 1958 Senator Murray as chairman of the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee directed that a study be made of Indian land trends. The study showed that between 1948 and 1957 holdings of individual Indian trust land decreased by 3,307,217 acres; although some of this was bought up by tribal enterprises, 2,595,413 acres passed out of Indian hands altogether.

It is true that annual oil and gas revenue of Indian tribal enterprises has increased from \$13 million in 1951 to approximately \$50 million today. This benefits a small segment of the Indian population through per capita payments to individual families. It must be kept in mind that only a few tribes have these natural resources on their reservations and much of this income is being reinvested in long range development programs.

At the same time another important source of income, the unskilled seasonal labor in farm areas near reservations, has been greatly curtailed by mechanization.

THE growing poverty of the Indian is reflected in his increasing reliance on welfare aid. In a government survey of the trends in welfare aid on reservations made several years ago, it was revealed that since World War II there has been a gradual increase of welfare aid on most reservations. This is especially true of the Plains area from Oklahoma to Montana where large groups of Indians are isolated on reservations far from population centers and employment opportunities. The Indians in the Southwest are better off because their land has not been lost through allotment. Many of the Southwest In-

dians have also kept alive their ancient social and political institutions and through these are generally better able to manage their economic resources than the culturally disintegrated Plains tribes. Indians on the Pacific Coast fare better because they are closer to employment opportunities. It is still a safe estimate, however, that at least half of the Indians living on reservations depend on welfare, either state or federal, for their livelihood.



In South Dakota, where most of the Sioux reservations are, the state welfare payments to Indians (both on and off reservations) rose an astounding 343 per cent between 1948 and 1959 whereas payments to non-Indians increased only 56 per cent. Figures indicating welfare aid are not available for all 50 states but it is known that the total federal welfare expenditure by the Bureau of Indian Affairs has increased 71 per cent since 1953.

Though the problem of growing population and dwindling economic resources has been developing for many decades, the critical situation became readily apparent only after World War II. In the decade of the 1930s the basic subsistence needs of reservation populations were met by Federal relief work projects, the PWA and the CCC. During the early 1940s reservation resources were less overburdened what with Indians trooping off the reservations to the armed services and to work in war industry. Back on the reserva-

tions many families were being assisted by allotments from the service pay of members of the family in military service. At the end of the war, many remained off the reservation but many more returned home.

Population pressure

In the boom period of the early 1940s the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the states with Indian reservation population had been lulled into a sense of complacency concerning the deteriorating economic situation on the reservation. The whole problem of growing population pressure on Indian reservations was dramatized for the American public by the plight of the Navajo in Arizona and New Mexico. In a comprehensive survey gathering information for a long range rehabilitation program for the Navajo reservation it was estimated that the maximum number of people that could be expected to make a decent living directly from reservation lands lay somewhere between 35,000 and 45,000. But in 1956 the tribal population stood at 78,000 with a projected population of 100,000 by 1962 and 350,000 by the year 2000. On the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota, typical of many reservations in the Plains area, it is estimated that if the Indians were using the reservation resources completely, it would support 500 families. But at present there are over 1,800 families living on this reservation.

The American Indian is clearly caught in a great squeeze of population increase and vanishing resources that is promising to become ever more critical. It is obvious that action must be taken to alleviate the situation. The question remains: what is to be done and who is to do it? The cultural and

social organization of most Indian groups is such that they are not prepared to govern themselves at the level of the complex American civilization. The Bureau of Indian Affairs has, therefore, long assumed the direction of the internal affairs of Indian tribes; the burden of economic guardianship has fallen into the Bureau's hands.

The Bureau of Indian Affairs has been aware for some time that the present reservation economies are unable to support their populations and that Indians will have to be directed into a non-agricultural economy. As far back as 1931, provision was made for off-reservation job placement. But it was only in 1950 that the Bureau decided to launch a full scale relocation program for those Indians who wished to seek permanent employment opportunities away from the reservation.

IN 1951, offices were opened on reservations to process Indian applications for relocation. Placement offices in Denver, Salt Lake City and Los Angeles (which had been set up earlier to serve the Navajo tribe) were converted to field offices to serve members of tribes from reservations across the country. As the program developed, more placement offices were opened in Chicago (1951); St. Louis, San Francisco, and San Jose (1956); Dallas, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Joliet, and Waukegan (1957).

Relocation process

The applicants for relocation are chosen on the basis of qualification and are given a series of counseling sessions on life away from the reservation. At the placement centers the relocatees are assisted in getting employment and are given further orientation in employment processes, family budgeting, adult

education opportunities and other problems they are likely to face. Financial assistance includes underwriting the costs of transportation, shipping household effects, subsistence en route to the relocation destination and subsistence for relocatees during the first few weeks at the point of relocation. It also includes health coverage protection for one year and assistance in other emergencies.

The Bureau of Indian Affairs has never viewed the relocation program as a panacea for the economic problems of the Indian. From 1952 to the most recent fiscal year, 1960, over 12,000 individuals and families were relocated, a movement involving 28,491 people. Of these, approximately 8,500 or one out of every three persons relocated are known to have returned to the reservation. The successful relocation of 20,000 Indians or approximately 7 per cent of the total reservation population in nine years is certainly a great help but it is not presently solving the problem of overpopulation on the reservation.¹

Moreover, in recent years the relocation program has run into formidable obstacles so that the number being moved into cities has been cut in half. The peak year for relocation was 1957, the last year of full prosperity before the current recession. Employment opportunities were then at their best. Since the recession of 1958, jobs have been scarce and it has been more difficult to place Indian workers.

The real obstacle to the relocation, however, lies in the fact that a very small percentage of the reservation population is ready for it. Mr. Glenn

Emmons, then Commissioner of Indian Affairs, pointed up this problem in 1958:

Over the past six years I feel certain that we have been providing relocation services very largely to the better educated and more skilled members of the population on the reservations. Veterans of World War II and Korea and other Indians who have had considerable experience off the reservation or who have acquired specific job skills have naturally been among the first to come forward in seeking relocation assistance. Today, I suspect that the great bulk of people in these categories who have any interest in relocation have already made the move. So we are getting down to a level of people who are very largely without specific job skills and, in many cases, without very much even in the way of ordinary schooling. This means, of course, that we will be facing a considerably more difficult and challenging job than ever before in helping these people to find suitable employment either in the relocation cities or in the near vicinities of the reservation.²


Moreover, most Indians have been reared in a cultural tradition which often makes it quite difficult to adjust to the urban way of life. The added fact that frequently the men have had no meaningful role to play in the idleness and isolation of the reservations has brought on habits of irresponsibility and excessive drinking in some of them.

IN view of the shortcomings of the Indians in basic schooling as well as in specific skills, the Bureau of Indian Affairs has considerably stepped up its educational program. The percentage of Indian children of school age attending school has increased from 75 per cent in 1950 to 95 per cent today. Funds appropriated for Indian education have increased from \$17,918,679 in 1950 to \$50,597,000 in the fiscal year, 1960.

¹ There are, of course, additional Indians moving off the reservations on their own initiative, though there is no way of estimating their number.

² Address at the Triennial Conference of the National Fellowship of Indian Workers, Estes Park, Colorado, July 3, 1958.

The basic, long range school policy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs at present is to provide educational opportunities for Indians in the white public school systems. Federal schools will be required until such time as favorable conditions can be developed for enrollment of all Indian children in public schools. The transfer of school operations to the states will continue as rapidly as conditions will permit the permanent integration of Indians into public school systems of their respective states. This policy, of course, does not affect the status of private or mission schools.



The experience with relocation has made it especially evident that specific vocational skills must also be developed among Indians if they are to profit from available economic opportunities either through relocation or in industries on or near the reservations. This is urgent since very few Indians can hope to find economic security in stock raising or in crop production on reservations; moreover, the demand for unskilled laborers in the American economy is steadily diminishing.

In 1956 a program of vocational training was put into action by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to train Indians, ages 18-35, who are unemployed or underemployed because they lack a marketable skill. The applicants are

screened and placed in recognized private or public vocational schools across the country for training in any skill in which they have aptitude. The Bureau pays the tuition costs and provides subsistence for the trainee and his family. This program has attracted comparatively large numbers of applicants among young Indians; in the four years following its inception 2,474 have entered training under the program. Of these 956 have completed their training, 794 dropped out of training, 724 are still in training. The program is still in its experimental stages but early reports indicate that many of the trainees with their new skills are preferring to return to their native reservation communities rather than settle in a distant urban community.

Higher education

Significant advances have also been made in higher education for Indian children. There are now about 3,200 enrolled in colleges, about four times the enrollment of 20 years ago. Twenty-four tribes now have funds for loans or grants for higher education. The Navajo, for example, have set aside \$10 million from the large tribal income from oil and gas as a trust fund for higher education. The federal government now awards competitive scholarships to Indian students (432 valued at \$335 each in 1957-58); moreover, the states of Minnesota, Montana, South Dakota, Wisconsin and Alaska have special scholarship programs for Indian students. In addition many colleges, foundations and church groups offer special aids.

INDIAN Commissioner, Glenn L. Emmons, speaking before a conference on industrial development sponsored by the Navajo tribe in 1959, stated still

another factor that the government has had to consider in its economic development program:

All along we have been keenly aware of the fact that large numbers of the Indians prefer to remain in their home areas. They are reluctant—understandably—to take up a new life in unfamiliar surroundings Yet . . . large numbers of Indians have no interest in, or aptitude for, the agricultural life. So industrial development in and around the reservations—the creation of non-agricultural jobs for Indian workers—is clearly a vital and indispensable part of our economic development program.³

It is difficult to explain precisely why Indians are so reluctant to move into unfamiliar surroundings; in any case, social scientists studying the acculturation of the American Indian are increasingly stressing the desire among Indians to maintain their cultural identity and tribal unity and to resist assimilation into the American way of life. This does not mean that there is a general intent to resurrect the old pre-reservation, tribal culture. The combination of influences from the dominant society and the isolation of the reservation have metamorphosed the tribal culture into a unique "reservation" culture. Still the Indian takes great pride in his racial origin; he is conscious, moreover, that he has been reared in a distinct "reservation" culture, which is not in harmony with the dominant American culture. Consequently, the tendency is to choose the path of greater security and happiness which is in the Indian's native community.

The plans for the industrial development of reservations were, at first, made for an extremely "Indian-type"

of program that would provide jobs only for Indian workers. Currently these plans are being expanded to include area-wide development which would involve both Indians and non-Indians. The state industrial development commissions, local chambers of commerce and other promotion-organizations are being brought into the picture.

In 1957 the Bureau of Indian Affairs established a new Branch of Industrial Development. This has a small coordinating staff in Washington and field industrialist specialists in Los Angeles and Chicago working directly with representatives of the private industrial companies; there are other specialists stationed in the various Indian area offices throughout the country.

Industry—a challenge

Bringing industry into reservation areas is a challenge because reservations are frequently located in areas deprived of the better transportation and resource facilities. Obviously, the greatest inducement is a plentiful supply of cheap labor; other inducements in the form of plant facilities and payment of "start-up costs" are being offered by local organizations or tribal governments or both working together. Through its on-the-job-training section of the adult education program, the Bureau also compensates firms for the cost of training a specified number of Indians.

Thus far the present program has been instrumental in bringing to reservation areas eight industrial firms employing 530 Indians. However, the program is moving slowly because many segments of the economy are not presently interested in expansion. The

³ "The Industrial Development Program of the Bureau of Indian Affairs," an address at Gallup, New Mexico, May 21, 1959.

industries most likely to locate on and around Indian reservations are those that require considerable hand labor and these are the industries that are encountering serious foreign competition, especially from countries like Japan.

Several far-reaching reservation development bills were introduced into Congress in 1960. One of the most noteworthy is that of Rep. E. Y. Berry (R., S.D.) which attempts to attract industry to reservations by a tax exemption feature modeled after that of the very successful "Operation Bootstrap" in Puerto Rico.

ALTHOUGH the economic stability of the Indian people will have to be achieved by moving more people into industrial employment, the maintenance and increase of the land base is still very important. The allotment system, however, has never led the Indian to a stable economic enterprise and has caused innumerable difficulties. Most Indians simply lease out their allotments to whites. Frequently, land has become so divided among the heirs that it supports no one. Since the United States government holds this land in trust, the Bureau of Indian Affairs must act as go-between for rentals and sales; where each small piece of land is increasingly divided among dozens of owners the time and money involved in processing these transactions is becoming exorbitant.

On the other hand, lands held collectively by a tribal enterprise (i.e., 75 per cent of all Indian holdings) have been generally better managed, are being held intact and are bringing a greater economic return. The trend is, therefore, to retain Indian land in Indian ownership but, above all, to en-

courage the increase of tribally owned lands. Thus, under present policy, when the sale of allotted land is approved, the tribe is given preference in negotiating a sale or, if there is multiple ownership, the tribe has first preference after an owner who may wish to buy out the rest of the heirs.

Two obstacles are hindering the increase of tribally owned lands. First, land sales are slow. In order for any land sale to take place, *all* of the owners must consent, a decision often involving many people. Sometimes the owners cannot even be found or, again, one owner out of many may block a sale. However, a study of the Indian heirship problem conducted by the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs is nearly finished. It seems likely that legislation solving the heirship problem and facilitating tribal purchase of land has progressed to the point where final action can be taken in the present Congress.



A second obstacle to the increase of tribally owned lands is the lack of funds necessary to buy land from individual Indians. There has existed since the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 the Indian Revolving Fund set up to help Indians acquire land; present recommendations are asking Congress

for a \$15 million increase in the appropriations for loans financing tribal land acquisition.


ALL of the government measures of the last eight years must be viewed in the light of a far-reaching shift in federal policy toward the American Indian. This is the highly controversial withdrawal policy. The program of terminating government services and supervision with regard to Indians on reservations was seriously set in motion by House Concurrent Resolution 108 of August, 1953, which stated:

It is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States, to end their status as wards of the United States and grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship.

The resolution also stipulated a given series of Indian tribes which "at the earliest possible time" were to be released from federal supervision.

Indian tribes and Indian rights organizations, such as the Association of American Indian Affairs and the National Congress of American Indians, entered vigorous opposition to this new policy. They argued that Indians have often been unable to keep their land holdings intact when on their own and that many older Indians with little or no education cannot compete successfully in the "outside world." Moreover, Indians fear that the new policy might cause a breakup in their tribal organization and a loss of their tribal entity. States with large Indian populations feel that Indians are a federal responsibility and they do not want to bear the burden of Indian care. Rep. Lee Metcalf (D., Mont.) characterized termination

as a means to "exploit the Indian's resources . . . get his land, his power sites, his forests, and other assets at bargain prices." It would hardly be fair to pose this as the avowed purpose of those calling for early termination but it is not unlikely that it would, in many cases, be the actual result.



The groups opposing present termination procedures admit that termination should be an ultimate goal but they maintain that termination is justified only when Indians have reached a position of truly equal competence. They marshal evidence to show that some of the tribes proposed for termination are far from being ready for it. The opposition also objects to the haste and immediacy with which termination has been pushed and the fact that the tribes themselves are not being properly consulted.

The proponents of termination consider the wardship status debilitating to the Indian and an actual hindrance to his further progress. They feel, also, that it provides an opportunity to cut government expenses and the proliferation of bureaucracy.

At the bottom of the whole issue lie two different views of the position of the Indians in America today. The group favoring termination as soon as

possible look upon the existence of Indians in separate communities with local sovereignty and with special legal rights and restrictions as something positively harmful to them. The Indian, like other minority groups, should be assimilated into the general American social and governmental system without delay, these people argue.

An unique minority group

Oliver La Farge, who sums up the views of the opposing party, contends that the Indians are a unique minority group, who, in spite of time and pressure, have retained their social and cultural individuality and want to keep it indefinitely. They have a right to their individuality as long as they wish to keep it. As conquerors, the American people owe the Indians their life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in terms of their own cultural tradition.

The stiff opposition to the termination policy by the Indian tribes and organizations has made its proponents move more slowly. Practically all are now agreed that unilateral action on the part of the federal government imposing termination is unwarranted, that the tribes have the right of self-determination, and that their consent must be gotten before any moves are made.

Meanwhile, under the directions in House Concurrent Resolution 108, the Interior Department has proposed to Congress and Congress has approved legislation ending federal supervision of about 16,000 Indians. However, serious problems have arisen in the case of the first two tribes terminated, the Menominee of Wisconsin and the Klamath of Oregon and there are moves under way to amend the original conditions of termination. It seems likely that in the future termination will continue but

at a more deliberate pace.

WHILE the debate on policy continues, there is no doubt that the government has been putting forth a vast and concerted effort to close the gap between expanding reservation populations and their decreasing economic resources. Federal appropriations for the activities of the Bureau of Indian Affairs have increased from about \$50 million annually in the late 1940s to \$150 million annually in the late 1950s. The health and education levels of the Indian are rising noticeably. The growing poverty of the Indian has been met head on with the programs of vocational training, relocation and industrialization but here efforts are so far not effectively coping with the problem.

Most of these programs have been aimed at moving the Indian to economic opportunities away from reservation areas. The Indian, however, has been reared in a distinct cultural tradition and even with a certain level of formal education and vocational skill he often feels great insecurity away from his native community. Fundamentally, the economic problem of the Indian is a cultural problem. Only when the values of the reservation community are more consonant with the values of an urban, industrial America will the Indian be able to move freely and successfully into American society. Precisely how the reservation communities should be brought to this status is the center of much discussion. It is proposed that the industrialization of the reservations, by giving jobs to a people who have been idle for generations, will reorganize family life and community purpose around wage-work goals. Such industrialization is only in its incipient stages; its precise effect is something that remains to be seen.

A postscript

As a postscript to this survey of the American Indian situation and government action, it seems necessary to call attention to a nebulous but extremely important factor in the scene. There is a growing spirit of self-determination and nationalism among Indians and in the long run this may be more important than any government action. A much more vocal and able leadership appears to be rising among the Indians; the people themselves, moreover, are becoming more politically conscious. As their population increases and their education level rises, they are realizing the power of their vote and what they can do for themselves if they act as a unit.

The growth of a movement called Pan-Indianism is also significant. Many Indians are looking for meaning in life in a synthetic, composite culture drawn from the particular Indian ethics of all sections of the United States. They have lost many of the customs of their original tribal group but have been assigned a status as a minority group; thus, they find it difficult to move into white, American society. They are developing a culture which is no longer Iroquois, or Dakota or Navajo but American Indian. Its importance is in the development of group consciousness and the power that grows out of unity and organization. These young Indians realize that their future lies in being peculiarly Indian Americans, not in being white Americans. It is expressed in intertribal visiting and Pan-Indian organizations such as the National Congress of American Indians. The movement is only beginning but it seems very likely to become something and, when it does, it may bring a great desire for independent self-determination.

An International Symposium

Duties to Underdeveloped Countries

The Argument

Leon H. Janssen (*Rotterdam*)

The Fires of Envy

Colin Clark (*Oxford*)

Distribution of Wealth

John M. Paul (*Washington*)

Terms Need Analysis

Thomas H. Mahony (*Boston*)

Problems in International Law

David Johnson (*London*)

Call for World Economic Community

Philip S. Land (*Rome*)

Politics as Primary

Paul Crane (*Oxford*)

Economics as Primary

Virgil Salera (*Washington*)

Role of Voluntary Agencies

Edward E. Swanstrom (*New York*)

Social Function of Ownership

James L. Vizzard (*Des Moines*)

New Orientation of Economics

Francesco M. Vito (*Milan*)

The Modalities of Aid

Philippe Laurent (*Paris*)

Postscript

Edward Duff (*Saint Louis*)

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Institute of Social Order

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"... The bulldozer technique may plough up more genuine

Pragmatics of Economic

RICHARD J. WARD

HOW MUCH SPEED may a development program employ in attempting to achieve the noble aims set for it? Granted the impelling moral need to aid the poorer nations, how rapidly do these lands have a right to expect their living standards to increase? Development enthusiasts have argued that the urgent moral and economic need for uplifting the poorer nations demands bold, massive programs which must be carried out as expeditiously as possible. Have the proponents of the bold view considered sufficiently the practical obstacles raised by too rapid development?

Four points are our present concern: 1. restating the urgent need, moral and otherwise for carrying on the worldwide economic development campaign; and 2. pointing out the practical problems, often overlooked by development enthusiasts, which stand in the way of demands for too rapid a pace for progress and growth in the underdeveloped countries.¹ Then, 3. the role of public

versus private enterprise in development programs will be examined. Finally, 4. certain conclusions will be drawn from the discussion.

THERE are numerous theories of economic development and the literature on the subject is voluminous.² There are two ideas which are most commonly expounded and from which certain problems emerge. One is that the underdeveloped countries are caught in the so-called "vicious circle."³ That is, it is extremely difficult to initiate real progress in countries like India or Indonesia or other densely populated areas because, as soon as some material gains are made, the population growth rate increases rapidly and offsets whatever economic progress is made. The first impact of economic development, it is

¹ According to Staley, there are about 70 underdeveloped countries, 19 in an intermediate stage and 13 highly developed. Nearly all of Africa and Asia (except the Union of South Africa and Japan) are in dire need of development; much of South America and Central America, and Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia in Europe. See Eugene Staley, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries*, Harper, New York, 1954.

² A few of the recent books in this area might be noted: Harvey Leibenstein, *Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth*, Wiley, New York, 1957; P. T. Bauer, *Economic Analysis and Policy in Underdeveloped Countries*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1957; Richard Meier, *Science and Economic Development*, Wiley, New York, 1956; Norman Buchanan and Howard Ellis, *Approaches to Economic Development*, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1955; Bauer and Yamey, *Economics of Underdeveloped Countries*, University of Chicago Press, 1957; G. Myrdal, *Rich Lands and Poor*, Harper, New York, 1957. There are also many books on specific countries by the United Nations and others.

³ See Myrdal, *ibid.*

trouble than it removes."

Development

pointed out, is to bring sanitation and medical practices to poverty-ridden areas, thus providing an immediate and precipitous drop in the death rate. At the same time, a small measure of improved material welfare is sufficient to induce the family to increase its size. The combination of these two results outweighs the material progress brought on by a conscious development program. It is said, therefore, that the rate of economic progress induced must be greater in the long run than the enhanced rate of population growth it induces.

The situation raises the question as to whether economic development under private capital auspices can be of sufficient magnitude or of proper orientation to effect the necessary rate of technological growth. It is argued by some economists that individual initiative, profit motivation and drive for gain is lacking in Asia and Africa, for example, and that economic development of these areas, moreover, cannot await the gradual evolution of these "capitalistic" motivations. It follows from this hypothesis that economic development of the underdeveloped areas

is primarily the job of national governments.⁴

In support of these views, one needs only to point historically to Japan or currently to India or Turkey or to many other countries in which economic development has been a central issue, in order to see the role of government-directed economic development programs. This is not to minimize the role of private capital in the programs, such as those directed so effectively by the Export-Import Bank, the Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other similar agencies. These devices for channeling private investment need, in fact, to be greatly strengthened. Nevertheless, there is a certain paradox here: the Western powers are the leading private enterprise economies in the world and are desirous of promoting elsewhere our economic habits of self-help; the patterns of economic development in most of the countries in which development programs are carried out, however, indicate a preference for or a preponderance of government-directed enterprise.

The reasons for this socialistic bias are not complex. Most economically backward countries need basic economic and social development before private enterprise can get started at all. Power stations, roads, railroads, communication systems, water facilities—all these must be provided to create the kind of atmosphere in which private enterprise best functions. Yet the creation of these basic utilities is not in itself a profitable venture. Lack of industry, urbanization, mechanized travel and other inadequacies suggest insufficient aggregate demands to make public

The writer teaches Economics at C. W. Post College, Greenvale, L.I., N.Y.

MAY, 1961

⁴ Competent elaboration of these arguments is in Edward S. Mason, *Economic Planning in Underdeveloped Areas*, Fordham University Press, New York, 1958.

utilities of this kind profitable in the capitalistic sense. It follows that the initial impetus to development tends to come through government-directed enterprise. The difficulty, however, is that both the governments and peoples involved in development get used as time passes to centrally planned projects and find it difficult to supplant this pattern when mining, manufacturing or other industrial enterprises are initiated.

Given the moral need and, indeed, the economic need for dynamic development programs, what is the cure for these two dilemmas: the "vicious circle" and what must be called the incipient tendency to socialism in the progress (largely inspired and financed by Western capitalism) of economically backward areas?

THE most frequently stated solution to the vicious circle concept is that economic development programs must be extensive enough to overcome the impetus to population growth. Myrdal and other economists, notably Barbara Ward and Colin Clark, have suggested that the scope of economic development programs must be bold and imaginative. That is, the rate of technological growth must be greater than any foreseen rate of population growth.

By bold and imaginative solutions it is assumed, of course, that extensive foreign aid will be coupled with vigorous domestic policies designed to encourage investment and development. Instead of a \$100-500 million loan, a bold step would imply a \$10 billion program, financed by various Western sources—say, by the United States, Western Europe and the international banking institutions. Ten \$ billion provided, let us say, to Turkey or India would surely, one would expect, speed

the country rapidly toward a more respectable standard of living. The example may be applied to any country needing extensive development. The question arises: what are the difficulties involved in such a massive effort?


Difficulties involved

The difficulties of an overambitious development program, however sympathetic one feels toward an extensive and dynamic approach, have become well-known in the post World War II world. It will clarify the issues if we deal with them separately.

1. *Imports.* A dynamic development program usually requires great expansion in imports. An undeveloped economy does not have the industrial capacity to provide its own development equipment and know-how. It must import from one of the industrially advanced nations. From the very beginning, therefore, a development program poses a serious foreign exchange problem for the undeveloped country. How can such a country earn the required sterling or dollars, let us say, to buy its imported development needs? Since it is underdeveloped, its exports cannot be increased as readily as its imports and without substantial exportables it cannot afford to import.

2. *Gifts.* The imaginative policy designed to overcome this import difficulty might be simply for the prosperous countries to make outright gifts of all the equipment and technical know-how needed. Thus, the undeveloped country need not worry about the foreign exchange problem. The United States has not been reluctant to follow this approach since the end of the war. But does it solve the stresses and strains of economic development?

Unfortunately, it does not. In some cases, in fact, outright gifts have been detrimental rather than beneficial to the furtherance of better international relations. Large scale shipments of grains to Southeast Asia, for example, were severely criticized by local leaders because they upset the regional trading pattern. When India received \$100 million worth of wheat from the United States, it did not buy as much rice from Burma or Thailand. Even domestic rice producers were adversely affected by a lower price on rice, since the wheat imports relieved the pressure on the domestic rice market. In the long run, of course, everyone in the whole region is benefited by the gift of wheat, since India could spend the money saved for development imports, which eventually would spur its own national income and imports. But the long run is difficult for mortal man to appreciate, considering the infinitesimal claim he has on it; moreover, opportunities lost today are lost forever.



Assuming United States' gifts of whatever equipment and know-how the undeveloped country needs, the specific projects—whether a power station, a factory, a mining facility or any other basic development—demand local labor and what might be called secondary needs: local food, housing, transportation and supplies. Payment for much of this equipment and for the local labor would be in the national currency. The national government or those responsi-

ble for the development projects must provide this currency. In Turkey, for example, payment for work done on projects would be in Turkish lira. The result of these substantial outlays, alas, is inflation. Turkey is mentioned here because it has in recent years experienced the benefits, the stresses and the distortions of an overly-ambitious development program. The impact of extensive development programs, promulgated in an atmosphere of impatient haste—and even when financed by foreign grant—almost inevitably generates serious inflationary pressures in the undeveloped country.

3. *Increased Exports.* Another feature of a bold, new development program would be to expand the exports of the undeveloped country as much as possible. This would enable the country to purchase more of the goods it needs for its expansion program. Here, the difficulty is evident from the consequent inflation. As a result of the inflation in the underdeveloped country, it cannot find markets for its expensive exports. Consequently, its exports tend to decline just when its need for imports is rapidly increasing, a situation aggravating the foreign exchange difficulties. Gifts from foreign countries can at best be only a temporary fillip to a development program. Once the development program gets underway, however, the need for imports increases while the feasibility of increased exports to pay for them diminishes in the face of inflationary prices of the undeveloped country's goods.

4. *Domestic Monetary Policy.* Another measure indulged in by undeveloped countries launched on bold and imaginative programs has been simply to print money. This policy is often

forced upon their leaders by the difficulties of raising domestic taxes on an already impoverished people. The taxes, in any case, could not be sufficient to pay the deficits incurred. Liberalizing the money supply, however accomplished, obviously cannot make a development program any easier for the backward country; it can only accelerate the inflationary spiral, resulting in further strictures on its export trade, not to mention the worsening of real incomes at home.

5. *Spreading Prosperity.* It is sometimes contended that once a development program gets underway, with new factories and extractive industries in operation, the local prosperity it engenders will spread through the country and eventually bring about a more or less balanced economy. While there is truth to this claim, it must be remembered that nearly all manufactured products and many agricultural ones must be sold in highly competitive world markets. This means the industries that are developed in the underdeveloped countries must be as efficient as those in the advanced countries if the newly developed country expects, as it must expect, to build up its export trade upon which it depends for a rising standard of living. World prices of many products fluctuate considerably, a fact which makes dependence on them for a substantial portion of the national income an unsettling factor in development programs.

In any case, a spreading prosperity, however desirable for the developing country, creates other problems. It adds to the inflationary tendencies by providing rapidly rising incomes for the domestic population, unmatched by rapidly rising production of the kind of goods the local population wishes to

buy. That is, the prosperity is often based largely on building up export industries, not industries producing for domestic consumption. The latter arrive late in the development programs of most underdeveloped nations.



Another aspect of the balanced economy problem is that often specific projects are undertaken which when completed cannot be supported by the rest of the economy. For example, with the use of United States funds and technical assistance, Afghanistan engaged in developing power facilities. Once constructed, however, the market for the project's output was not sufficient to pay for its upkeep. Nor was the country sufficiently provided with native technicians to maintain and promote the use of the project. When the United States had completed its contract obligations, it was up to the Afghan government to maintain the facility. As it turned out, the expenses of upkeep were too much for the Afghan economy to meet through taxes; relations with the United States, as a result, actually became strained over the matter. Thus, development projects do not themselves promote a general prosperity; they may provide the basis for it but achieving balanced growth is a serious practical problem, aggravated by inflation, equipment shortages, balance of payments distortions and institutional and cultural obstacles.

6. *Devaluation.* Another device for alleviating the impact of inflation on exports is a devaluation of the domestic currency. This improves the terms of trade for countries trading with the undeveloped country so that exports

usually increase. However, devaluation does not really get at the root of the problem; it merely buys time. With a trend of rapidly rising prices, caused by a combination of the factors already examined, monetary devaluation in a rapidly developing country tends to merge into the general inflation. In other words, domestic prices continue to rise until the advantage of devaluation—lower export prices—is lost.

7. *Domestic Stability.* In order to carry on a continuing development program in a backward country, there must be stability of the government and the monetary system. It is difficult to attract capital to a country whose government is shaky. Paradoxically enough, it often happens that governments are shaky precisely because of the inflation brought on by extensive development programs! A bold, imaginative approach to domestic development on the part of a progressive-minded government may actually lead to more trouble than progress for the government involved. A development program, once begun, is very demanding of more and more funds. The facilities once built must be maintained, even while they may operate at heavy losses due to an insufficient market for their output. Foreign loan obligations must be met; the severely strained domestic budget, moreover, must not be too far out of balance if the country is to remain solvent.

To provide domestic political and economic stability in the face of these problems is not an easy task and often governments fall in the attempt. When this happens, the development program is in more difficulty because foreign investors become wary of committing any more capital to the country in question; furthermore, it becomes in-

creasingly difficult for the undeveloped country to obtain loan extensions or credit for imports abroad.

Simultaneous difficulties

These seven difficulties are not intended to be exhaustive. They indicate the day-to-day practical complications actually incurred in a program of developing economically backward countries. What is more, all of these difficulties tend to occur simultaneously. One source of trouble is no sooner attacked than its remedy has stirred difficulties in other sectors. It is clear that we are faced here with a great dilemma. There is much enthusiastic support for taking impressive strides toward developing the needy areas of the world. Most will further agree that there should be no delay and little limit in the opening of our hearts and coffers to the less fortunate peoples of the world. We are told that in order to defeat the insidious and potent compulsion of the "vicious circle," development programs must be massive; small projects will not do and may even aggravate the evils of sub-standard living conditions by spurring population rates that exceed the ability of the small improvements to offset them. This is one horn of the dilemma. The other is that massive development programs run headlong into the kind of practical difficulties briefly listed above. They vary in complexity and combination from one undeveloped country to another; in every instance, they require a constant application of practicable economic criteria for solution. Basically, the problem seems to be one of timing: people want to get on with progress "in our time" but too much speed, on the other hand, creates bottlenecks to check that progress.

IT has been noted that there is a strong tendency for economic development programs in backward areas to be undertaken under the auspices of national governments, and this despite the fact that most of the money for the development may have come from Western private enterprise economies. Herein lies a possible cure for the dilemma posed earlier. It might be contended that, however desirous we all are of getting on with economic development as fast as we can, the pace must of necessity be slower. Rome was not built in a day, to use the old phrase; neither can Southern Italy, India, Turkey or the Africa of our times. Economic development is simply not a program which can be accomplished in a few years, nor even in ten or twenty years.

Role of private enterprise

From this point of view (which unfortunately seems neither bold nor imaginative), it may well be argued that private enterprise should be a more prominent partner with national governments in development programs. That is to say, growth of the underdeveloped areas requires more private enterprise to balance the massive and rapidly expanding development programs carried out by national governments, programs which have led to the kind of practical problems we have been considering. Development sponsored by government planning tends to be too one-sided. On the other hand, encouragement of domestic private enterprise, using whatever local resources and talents are available to each region of an undeveloped country, might promote a broader pattern of income increases; these could establish in turn

a broader production base on which rising incomes could feed.

There is, however, no question in the minds of most economists that economic development of underdeveloped areas can only be done with the extensive aid of the national governments concerned. In a word, economic development of undeveloped countries has (in the strict economic sense) a strong socialistic bias. In its early stages, this is undoubtedly inevitable and perhaps desirable. It should, however, be no less desirable to balance this approach with increased encouragement of local private enterprise. This will inspire a more natural development and will increase the share of the native populations in the development programs and, at the same time, promote more balanced economic activity. Thus, the total amount of foreign capital directed to assisting the undeveloped areas need not be less than it has been—it should, indeed, increase—but it might be better directed to the goal of promoting the production and consumption of goods the local populations may take part in producing and consuming.

NEARLY every undeveloped country engaged in the battle for economic progress is confronted with these problems. There are some countries, such as Turkey, for example, which have in recent years exhibited all of them in rather clear relief. In 1958, this particular country received \$359 millions from the United States, West Germany and the International Monetary Fund to help her out of her serious international deficit position, one brought on by an over-zealous development program. To quote an authoritative source:

The Turkish authorities might be well advised in making use of their new

breathing space [the \$359 million] to give top priority to the strengthening of the country's basic payments position, relegating the fulfillment of their ambitious capital development plan to second place.⁵

Turkey's serious domestic inflation also raised another problem: foreign goods became cheaper than her own and this added to the impetus to import. Turkey's development program has proceeded too rapidly:

Turkey should now take a close look at her development programme to see whether it will in fact take her through to external payments health before the latest aid programme runs out. If not, she should revise it to make sure that she does not have to pass the hat around again. For next time it may come back with much less in it.⁶

It is clear that the suggestion to revise Turkey's program means that her development aims must be more modest and must be slowed down, particularly in sectors which develop too rapidly relative to the remainder of the economy. In accepting the \$359 million in aid, Turkey was expected "to balance the budget, eliminate deficits on state enterprises, restrict credit expansion and *bold back* on capital investment to really worthwhile projects."⁷

There has never been any question about the need for an expeditious economic development of Africa, Asia and the Middle East. And there has been no lack of enthusiasm for vigorous, dynamic and generous programs of development. Our present purpose has been to remind ourselves that the moral need for economic progress in the uncommitted, underdeveloped world must take into account the severe practical difficulties involved in the

most legitimate economic development program. Native populations should not delude themselves into expecting miraculous cures of their ancient economic ills overnight.

Conclusions

To set up an all-inclusive program that would avoid the difficulties we have been examining would provide a brilliant and widely-heralded finish to this article. Would that this were possible. In fact, such a program probably does not exist anywhere. Certain conclusions, however, are implied from our survey; these may be enumerated as follows:

1. Economic development of economically backward areas should not be one-sided. Single-minded development of, say, power stations, mines or rails is not enough. There should be a generous but long range program for developing many productive enterprises so that output may match rising incomes, thus avoiding severe inflationary spirals.⁸ This means selecting localized projects in numerous areas, training local labor and providing incentives which are understandable within the particular culture.

2. With somewhat less emphasis on large scale government projects and more on widespread local projects (no diminishing of funds expenditure implied), there might be less tendency for imports of equipment to rise so rapidly, thus causing balance of payments difficulties. The value of equipment needed might be no less in the development of local projects, but it is suggested that the importation of this kind of equipment will take place over a longer period.

⁵ *The Financial Times* (London), Wednesday, August 6, 1958, "Turkey's 'Sick' Economy," p. 3.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *The Economist*, August 9, 1958, p. 481. Emphasis supplied.

⁸ The Turkish wholesale price index, 1955-1959, went as follows: 119; 142; 164; 189; 219 (4 months). 1953 = 100.

3. The development of more local projects suggests an increasing role for private enterprise in the development programs, one which will act as a balance to the current concentration on government controlled (and owned) development enterprises.

4. While economic development is one of the world's great needs and problems, it should be recognized that countries, like individuals and families, *can* live beyond their particular means. To desire a higher standard of living is a legitimate moral as well as economic aspiration for anyone or any people. But to desire and expect a doubling or tripling of one's standard in short years may not be legitimate (unless, of course, the standard is a starvation one). This principle is to some degree equally applicable to undeveloped countries. It is difficult for the present generation to say that their development efforts are for the next generation but the evidence inclines to indicate that much of it is.

WHAT this summary suggests, finally, is that while the impelling moral need for economic development of the undeveloped regions often inspires extraordinary proposals and generosity in programs undertaken, the bulldozer technique may plough up more genuine trouble than it removes. We need to recognize the enormous practical difficulties involved and to be equally bold and imaginative about solving *them*. In the past the economic development programs have not given sufficient consideration to the *impact* of the bold imaginative programs which, in their understandable eagerness, Western enthusiasts have recommended and the underdeveloped countries too impatiently implemented.

Symposium on Humanism

Behind Marxism is a philosophy of what man is and for what he exists. Behind Christianity is also a philosophy of man and his destiny. These two ideas of man are just as much at war as the opposed political or economic systems of the Soviet and of the Christian West.

Moreover, no dream of social order can be practicable unless it is based upon a clear and realistic understanding of what and why man is.

So crucial is this question of man that SOCIAL ORDER devoted an entire double-number (the May-June, 1953 issue) to an exposition of this pivotal question. Copies are still available.

The Contents:

CHRISTIAN HUMANISM FOR AMERICA	<i>The Editors</i>
THE SEARCH FOR THE NEW MAN	<i>H. A. Reinhold</i>
MARXIST AND SECULAR HUMANISM	<i>James Collins</i>
GOD AND CHRISTIAN HUMANISM	<i>Philip Donnelly</i>
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SOCIALISM REVISITED

Professor Kennedy teaches economics at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

• William F. Kennedy

THIS IS A GOLDEN AGE for the history of ideas. Scholarship in this field is at a high, perhaps an all-time peak. Yet the development has been remarkably uneven; rapid growth in the history of the natural sciences and medicine has occurred simultaneously with decline in the history of the social sciences, particularly economics. Universities have been adding courses, even new departments, in the history and philosophy of science and their staffs of research scholars and teachers have attracted large numbers of young students eager to embark on the intellectual adventure. It is ironic that at such a time the history of economic thought has become a declining enterprise, for the economists discovered much earlier than the natural scientists the significance of a history of their science. Furthermore, the economists embodied this ideal in their program of professional education and the history of economic thought remains a required field for the Ph.D. candidate. The requirement, however, has become a formality and not the object of lively interest which the history of the natural sciences now is.

The decline in the history of economic thought has been marked by a weakening on the side of demand, not of supply. The past decade has been notably productive of high quality research in-

cluding Sraffa's ten volumes on Ricardo, Stark on Bentham, the general histories of Schumpeter and Taylor, Dorfman and Spiegel on American economic thought, Lord Robbins on classical thought, and many others. While the quality of this scholarship is impressive, the lack of attention it got is even more so. Professor Sraffa told me that he could recall only two American economic journals that reviewed his work on Ricardo. When I commented that this may have been due to a reluctance of the publisher to make this expensive ten-volume set readily available, he assured me that this was not so. Lack of interest was the explanation.

In the context of our unhistorically-minded age, it is not paradoxical to point out another great work in the history of economic ideas and to predict that it will receive scant attention. The book is Professor Carl A. Landauer's *European Socialism*.¹ This is a truly monumental work, a monument to Professor Landauer's insight in conceiving a grand scheme, to his courage in holding faithfully to it, and to his patience in the daily work of rendering its details. This is a definitive work on European socialism, a history of socialist ideas related to the social movements

¹ University of California Press, Berkeley. 2 Vols. 1894 pp. \$20. (Hereafter reference to this work will be made by page numbers given in parentheses in the text.)

from the Industrial Revolution to the rise of Hitler. The focus is on ideas and events in Germany, France, Russia, and Italy, with some attention to Sweden, Denmark, and Belgium. To paint a picture on so broad a canvas was a tremendous undertaking of research but Professor Landauer has not been buried under the burden of his work and has written a lively account that is of interest even to the non-specialist. This history of socialism is significant for us in many ways. It reveals much that lies behind the great struggle between East and West; it throws light on the revolutionary stirrings in underdeveloped countries; it also helps to explain the internal problems of the governments of both the free and communist worlds.



A causerie, such as this, can treat only a few issues raised in this comprehensive history. One of first interest and importance is how the work deals with the Marxian system of thought. Professor Landauer finds in the Marxian system a unity of purpose: "the discovery of the direction and the form which the historical process has taken and will take." (p. 139) Marx believed that he had discovered the laws of history. The first determines the direction of history and is called historical materialism or the economic interpretation of history; the second expresses the form of the process and is called the

dialectic. Professor Landauer's treatment of the economic interpretation of history is of particular value; he succeeds in saying something new about a question that has been much worked over.

Our author believes that the economic interpretation should more strictly be called a technological interpretation because both Marx and Engels held that "the physical conditions and the technique of production" mold economic conditions and hence determine the superstructure of political, philosophical, religious and artistic developments." (p. 144) For example, as in a primitive stage of society land can be tilled only by common effort; therefore, communal possession of land is necessary. Later, changes in techniques may make individual effort more productive, calling for a division of land in the interest of greater over-all efficiency. This material basis has two elements: physical conditions and technological development. The latter changes more rapidly and hence is more important in explaining historical change.

Professor Landauer finds untenable the Marxian view that the "ultimate cause" of all history is economics or technology. Further consideration of this view requires resort to some "softening" interpretation. He suggests substitution of the idea that technological change is a channel for the idea that it is the ultimate source of all change. Let us assume, Professor Landauer says, that technological change is the channel through which all impulses of history must operate. There is much to be said for this assumption:

Among all movements in history technological progress has a unique position because it rarely stops and is almost never

reversed. Consequently, among all types of historic change, only technical change can be foreseen with any degree of certainty. (p. 148)

Despite all this promise, the view of technological change as the channel for all historic impulses must be rejected. Professor Landauer points out that progress of technology is caused by the accumulation of knowledge and a deepening of mathematical insight; he adds that this scholarly thought has a momentum of its own; it is not dependent on outside impulses. Thus, the new concept of Copernicus operated directly on religion, philosophy and art; its influence did not have to await passage through technological change expressed in exploration and the resulting new trade routes. Values, too, have a momentum independent of the channel of technological change. They are never in perfect equilibrium; the pendulum swings and when it gets too far in one direction, man reasserts values that appear to be all but lost. Our ideas and values are directly connected to those that went before and result either in further development or reaction against them.

To say that the economic or technological interpretation is not the ultimate cause or channel of history is to offer a basic criticism of Marxism. For, if the economic influence is just one of many (even though the weightiest of all), there can be no guarantee that at some time this influence may not be overcome by the others. History then would not be, as Marx held, calculable.

Space does not permit further detailed consideration of Professor Landauer's treatment of Marx. His treatment throughout is consistent with what has been examined here. He ap-

proaches Marx with sympathy and understanding but also with penetrating and critical intelligence.

Our author concludes that Marx's contribution to thought was that

he impressed upon whole generations of economists the necessity of examining their institutional presuppositions, and upon generations of historians and sociologists the significance, from the viewpoint of their own fields, of economic theory. (p. 200)

Marx's contributions to social and political reality included teaching the workers the affinity of labor and socialism; he also taught socialist intellectuals to ally themselves with the working class since only through class-forces could society be changed and no other class was susceptible to socialism. He shaped the labor movement of the future by giving the workers self-reliance and the mental ability to wait, for though his was a revolutionary theory and program, it taught the workers "that economic forces rather than individual attacks upon bourgeois society would ultimately achieve the great social change." (p. 202) The insistence on the need of Marxist theory for all workers taught them a social science, one-sided as it was, and gave them respect for science. It also made for a pro-technique attitude and kept the labor movement from a hopeless struggle against the machine. The gravest defect of Marxism as a philosophy and program for future socialism, in Professor Landauer's view, was its rigid determination which led to denunciation of all Utopianism and consequently to a ban on discussion of structural problems. Hence, when socialists came into power they were forced to "work out solutions through experiments on the living object at a tremendous cost

in human lives and happiness." (p. 206) The Russian experience provides the grim illustration of this point.

Professor Landauer's starting thesis was that socialism was not mere speculation, that its history comprised movements as well as ideas, and that a full account had to show how ideas shaped social and political reality and how the latter in turn shaped ideas. The history of socialism that he has produced justifies the original thesis; it shows that history has not been the simple unfolding of events rigidly determined by economic forces as Marx envisaged.

Socialism in the political arena

The socialist in politics found himself in a much more complicated situation than he was led to expect from the Marxian concept of class struggle, wherein capitalists become richer and fewer, and the proletariat proliferates to the point where it seizes power. Socialist parties gradually grew in power but this growth did not take place in a vacuum. Growth established relationships with the middle class which was a necessary ally in extending the suffrage to the urban masses of workers. Universal male suffrage in most of Europe, and even in England, came late in the 19th century. The workers were conscious that their hope of progress depended on democratic advances sponsored by liberalism and supported by the middle class. Thus, there has always been a strong tie between liberalism and the working-class movement. This accounts for the lack of popular appeal of conservative, aristocratic humanitarians, like Carlyle, Disraeli and Ruskin.

The relationship of socialism and liberalism, of working-class and middle-class parties, also involved fundamental conflict. The first and classic case of conflict arose in France when republican forces were drawn into unity as an aftermath of the Dreyfus case. In an effort to continue this unity, a liberal premier invited a socialist, Alexander Millerand, into his cabinet in 1899. Entry of a socialist for the first time into a modern European cabinet precipitated a national and international crisis for socialism and gave rise in all countries to the recurring issue of ministerialism or Millerandism. Cooperation with non-socialist parties became no less a decisive issue when socialist parties became strong enough to form governments. The typical political structure of European countries was multi-party; hence, a socialist party with a strong plurality could only form a government by some coalition, a move importing compromise with non-socialist needs and interests and with the capitalistic state. Gradualist and reformist socialists accepted compromise in the interest of quicker social reforms and a strengthening of the party for the future; orthodox Marxists repudiated the move. The latter tradition went so far as to declare that socialists should never vote for the budget of a capitalistic state except under extraordinary conditions. Although the Marxists came to have the most rigid views on cooperation with other parties, Marx in his theory and practice had not taken this line. Landauer attributes the attitude in Germany more to Schweitzer's than to Marx's ideas. Ground for this interpretation can be found in Marx in his concept of irreconcilable conflict be-

tween two classes and its resolution in dictatorship of the proletariat.

The most tragic outcome of non-cooperation was the rise of Hitler. Cooperation of socialists and communists to stop Hitler could have succeeded as late as November, 1932, when these two parties won a total of 221 seats as against 196 for the Nazis. Cooperation had been made impossible by the strategy dictated by Stalin to Thälmann, leader of the German Communist Party. Stalin's policy made the Social Democrats rather than the Nazis the enemy number one; it put Hitler into a position of power from which he was later able to destroy both the Social Democrat and the Communist Parties.

The rise of fascism, the event marking the end of Professor Landauer's history, poses the question: To what extent was European socialism responsible for the barbarism, violence and disorder released in our time by fascism and communism? I find socialism more responsible than Professor Landauer reveals in his summary of its achievements:

Socialism has civilized the movement of the lower classes, has turned it from machine-breaking and sporadic upheavals to a deliberate and rational use of political and economic organization, has reconciled it with modern technology, and made it an effective (and in many historical situations the principal) defender of human liberty. Although communism and fascism can be regarded as offshoots of socialism, the latter has also proved an effective dam builder against the expansion of both. (p. 1666)

Socialism had its achievements but these were swallowed up in failure to fulfill its fundamental mission, the stable reorganization of economic life required by the Industrial Revolution. European socialism was one of the

great answers proposed to the problems of a new age, and a great failure. It failed most grievously at the very heart of the movement where the doctrine was held in its purest state, in Germany, Russia, Italy and France. Better answers to the problems of the age were proposed and realized where socialist doctrines were only part of the mixture of ideas, in Scandinavia, England and America.



European socialism failed as a system of political economy because it lacked the flexibility of the "mixed" systems in the face of the vast, complicated, ever-changing problems generated by the Industrial Revolution. Socialism was too rationalistic, too simplistic, hence too dogmatic and ideological. For example, socialism gave insight into the emergence of a new class structure from the Industrial Revolution but this class structure did not consist of the two simple classes conceived in Marx's mind. It was a much more complicated thing, comprising many classes with different economic needs and interests; it gave rise to a range of problems beyond the scope of the model introduced by Marx.

Socialism was rational, as Professor Landauer claims, but rationality has its limits in political and social affairs. Burke criticized Jacobinism as "naked reason" pushed too far and Coleridge warned against the same tendency in Benthamism. The Anglo-American political temper has been more flexible,

hence better adapted to rapid change in a dynamic age, because it is a blend of rationality, custom and a pragmatic approach to new problems. The hyper-rationalism in European socialism expressed itself in ideological consistency and rigidity. This was illustrated in the issues of Millerandism and non-cooperation with other parties and the capitalistic state. Political paralysis was proportionate to consistency; ideological consistency made it difficult for the German socialists to deal adequately with the agricultural sector, while the Swedish working-class movement was willing to sacrifice consistency for a workable compromise with farmers.

European socialism put too much emphasis on the economic; in its political form it was more an economic party than a political party prepared to undertake the traditional tasks of politics. Non-socialists often feared this combination of economic and political force. To them, loss of political power sometimes threatened loss of economic status so serious as to appear worth fighting for. In the Anglo-American tradition political and economic domination were more completely separated. The political tradition of freedom antedated the economic theories, interests, and parties created by the Industrial Revolution; economic conflicts, moreover, could be mediated by an independent political authority as the U.S. Supreme Court. Much might be lost in a political election but not everything political and economic.


Although Professor Landauer represents a specific point of view within the European socialist tradition, he has not distorted its history. It would be almost impossible to find a competent scholar with adequate experience un-

dertaking so vast a research project without some prior vision of how the facts hung together and what they meant. If one were absolutely neutral to a project, he would not have the love for it that inspires one's labors. Professor Landauer has fully met his scholarly obligations of objectivity without denial or repudiation of his own values and preferences. What is even a rarer accomplishment, he has remained throughout the work urbane to all his intellectual opponents.

This review can only claim to have done its part to remove one of the great disappointments of the scholar, that his work is not reviewed. The author may still suffer that other great disappointment: that the reviewer did not even notice the parts of the work into which the author poured his heart's blood and which represent, in his view, his greatest contribution. There are many fine aspects of this work which have not been touched upon; one of them especially deserves mention: the excellent treatment of recent socialist theory in Chapter 45 on Neo-Marxism and Chapter 46 on *The Desirable Society*. I know no other source that matches this for penetrating analysis and clear, concise statement of these developments in thought.

The University of California Press should also be commended for its part in this contribution to scholarship by the provision of binding, paper, and typography appropriate to this work. Errors are extremely few for so large and difficult a printing job. My only criticism is that Volume I is too large (1200 pages) and too heavy for comfortable reading. Three volumes of equal size would have made for more pleasing appearance and easier reading.

Books



SOVIET COEXISTENCE STRATEGY: A Case Study of Experience in the International Labor Organization. By Alfred Fernbach. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 63 pp. \$1

THE TRADE UNION SITUATION IN THE U.S. International Labor Office, Geneva, iv, 148 pp. \$1.25

THE TRADE UNION SITUATION IN THE U.S.S.R. International Labor Office, Geneva, iv, 136 pp. \$1.25

"Reports of the Governing Body, Committee on Freedom of Association," OFFICIAL BULLETIN, (v. xliii, No. 3), International Labor Office, Geneva, xiv, 335 pp. \$1

YEARBOOK OF LABOUR STATISTICS. International Labor Office, Geneva, xxiii, 551 pp. \$5

Because the United Nations is primarily a political body, it is only natural that its sub-organizations, regardless of objectives, should become involved in "cold war" maneuvering. The latest and to some minds the most bitter manifestation of it has been taking place in the International Labor Organization, a tripartite international body made up of representatives of labor, management and government, originally established under auspices of the League of Nations in 1919 and later taken under the authority of the United Nations.

The major struggle in the ILO involves the tripartite arrangement which has been subject to challenge since the re-entrance of Soviet delegates in 1954. Western nation representatives charge that all Iron Curtain delegates, albeit designated as "management" or "labor" functionaries, are in fact merely additional representatives of the Soviet government and as such have no really independent judgment to act on policies and programs of interest to their respective groups in the International Labor Organization. Hence, the "tripartite" character of the organization is undermined.

As Mr. Fernbach points out in his Public Affairs Press pamphlet, the matter was finally resolved on the basis of function rather than ideology, since "freedom of association as the Western capitalist understands it does not exist" in communist countries "because of great difference in political and economic structure." Employer members are thus merely plant managers who exercise independent judgment in the technical sphere within limits of the overall economic plan. Similar restrictions apply to labor representatives.

This matter of "freedom of association" was forcibly brought to a head in 1960, when the International Labor Organization authorized an on-the-spot study of the extent of such freedom in the United States and in the Soviet Union. The results of these studies were subsequently published and have been the subject of attack by United States labor leaders and others interested in Soviet labor unions. In its February 25, 1961 issue of *AFL-CIO News*, the AFL-CIO Executive Council is reported as labelling the ILO Soviet report as "not objective," seeking to shut its eyes to the Communists' "contempt for and flagrant violation of freedom of association" under the "cover of neutrality." This resolution merely reaffirmed an earlier stand of the AFL-CIO, reported in the *New York Times* by columnist C. L. Sulzberger, who agreed that it was "naive to apply Western objectivity to a system of dictatorship and censorship."

Labor economist Emily Clark Brown, however, in a letter of February 10, 1961, addressed to the *New York Times*, praises the ILO report in its virgin attempt to explore Soviet trade union functions and points out that, in an admittedly unique and different political environment, it goes without saying that trade union functions will also be unique and different. She thinks that ILO has raised the proper issues

of freedom of association without answering its own questions on such matters as "the effects of the relationship of the unions to the party and the government; the position of individual workers as members of trade unions; the question of strikes; and the question of trade union freedom in such a system."

Monsignor George G. Higgins, Director of the Social Action Department of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, in two articles appearing in his weekly Catholic press column, took a fairly similar position. He wrote: "My first criticism of the report is that it tries too hard to be objective. That is to say, the authors of the report merely summarize their findings without making any attempt to evaluate them and without coming to any conclusions about the trade union situation in the U.S.S.R. I also think that the authors of the report went too far out of their way to 'explain' the subordination of Soviet unions to the communist apparatus. Be that as it may, the facts which are assembled in the I.L.O. report speak for themselves. In summary, they point to the conclusion that freedom of association, as this term is generally understood in the United States and other democratic nations, does not exist in the U.S.S.R." Undoubtedly any such evaluation would have spelled out in detail certain conclusions which the Soviet government would have considered unwarranted.

As Mr. Fernbach indicates, many of the problems of trade unions under dictators parallel the restrictions on freedom of association in underdeveloped countries for different reasons. In the latter case habits of voluntary association and cooperation are not yet strongly established, whereas in the former such habits have been made subservient to the economic and political objectives of the state. Whether the ILO, in relating trade union organization development in the Soviet Union, overemphasized the "underdeveloped" character of the labor movement in the light of Soviet economic history and the progress brought about by the industrial and political revolution is certainly debatable. For example, the report states: "In a country where revolutionary activity and strikes are synonymous, the Mission could find no evidence of strikes . . . and there was nobody to strike

against since the means of production belonged to them [the workers]."

Is such a statement "whitewash" since it seems to paraphrase Soviet propaganda or is it a statement of fact which should be interpreted by knowledgeable readers in its true light? Apparently, it depends on the reader. This reviewer, as a labor economist, feels qualified to draw her own conclusions about freedom of association in the Soviet Union, which are verified by the ILO report: *viz*, there is none as we in the United States know it. Whether the Soviet workers would want the kind of freedom of association that exists in our trade unions is another question, the answer to which is not quite so clear in view of their different background, tradition, education, political and economic structure, etc. This, I think, is the message the ILO report seeks to impart. United States labor leaders, on the other hand, want to share their democratic ideals with the rest of the world and are surprised and shocked to learn that the ILO does not seem to be giving its wholehearted support to their crusade. It must be borne in mind that the ILO seeks to represent all ideologies in the world and would lose its effectiveness if it attempted to impose Western thinking on its members. This problem is merely a reflection of a similar struggle going on in the United Nations itself.

Similarly, in its report on the United States trade union movement and freedom of association, the ILO reports the bad with the good, pointing out certain legal restrictions imposed by injunction and Taft-Hartley provisions, which other parts of the world might interpret in an unfavorable light. However, the ILO Mission concludes that "trade union rights [in the United States] are secure and freedom of association . . . is a reality . . . [and] will continue to be respected in the future," despite attempts by some employers and legislative groups to curtail organizational activities.

As a further step in seeking out violations of freedom of association among its members, the International Labor Organization has set up a Committee on Freedom of Association, authorized to act on various complaints presented by unions of particular countries and trades alleging anti-union

conduct on the part of the government involved, such as prohibition of the right to strike and picket, persecution and arrest of labor leaders and interference with free speech and free assembly of trade unions. In the above report published in the ILO *Official Bulletin*, some 60 cases were considered by the Committee, of which about 40 were dismissed without further consideration. With respect to the remaining cases, recommendations were made to the respective governments involved for remedial action. Moral suasion combined with the light of publicity and the process of complaint and appeal are the Committee's only sanctions.

Another important work of the International Labor Organization is demonstrated in its *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*. This 20th edition presents a summary of principal statistics relating to labor in all parts of the world, printed in English, French and Spanish. Included are such economic data as population, employment, unemployment, hours of work, wages, consumer prices, family income, social security, industrial injuries and industrial disputes. Most tables, covering 89 countries, are confined to the years 1953-59 in this edition but a few have data going back to 1937-38. In addition to the factual material which is thus made available, the ILO performs the service of standardization of terminology and technique, so important to comparative research in the study of economic activity throughout the world. At least here there is little room for ideological disagreement.

GLADYS W. GRUENBERG
Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA. By Dexter Perkins. Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge. xi, 124 pp. \$3

Consisting essentially of the three Davis Washington Mitchell lectures delivered at Tulane University in 1960, *The United States and Latin America* is written by an academician noted for his reasonableness, moderation, meticulous scholarship and sound historical judgments. It is written, moreover, by a mature and optimistic authority who feels that the corner has been turned in Latin American relations, that

danger signs are gradually disappearing and that henceforth Latin Americans can be expected increasingly to behave in reasonable and responsible manner—that is, more like we wish them to. Finally, it is written by a man who, to put it bluntly, seems thoroughly out of contact with the menacing implications of the potent intellectual, social and economic factors that have been recently appearing in Latin America. Thus, although the short book is a masterful appraisal of many aspects of United States-Latin American relations, it is an appraisal that went out of date right after World War II.

Perkins, for example, seems to feel that sound hemisphere relations rest upon the willingness of the southern republics to balance their budgets. In annoyance, therefore, he wags a finger at Brazil but is delighted with what he detects elsewhere, going so far as to make the absurd assertion: "Argentina is making a sensational comeback, after an era of widespread inflation. Chile is mastering its difficulties. Colombia is doing better than ever before." Although these three countries cited may be balancing their budgets, their general economic policies are probably compounding the social problem and hastening the recourse to radical expedients. The criterion for judging whether foreign capital is safe in today's Latin America is not merely whether there is an anti-inflation program underway but whether native possessors of capital are acting with sufficient attention to the problems of social justice to prevent capitalism from becoming for increasing numbers of the reform-minded a dirty word. If we do not help Latin Americans to do more than balance their budgets, if we do not goad their leaders toward social reform, then capitalism will come under increasing fire in Latin America, and along with it the United States.

False optimism is surely behind Perkins' conclusion that socialism, because it is passing out of vogue in Europe, will decline in Latin America. Socialism is in decline in Europe because of the success of capitalism. In Latin America, capitalism has conspicuously failed to meet the main problem that has been apparent since 1945: assimilating into society the half-to-one-third of the population that has so far been

excluded from true participation in the national existence. The rosy picture of communism's gradual eclipse is also unrealistic, as the March, 1961, Chilean elections reveal. And, the implication that our handling of the Guatemalan problem in 1954 had the approbation of the majority of Latin Americans shows almost as profound a lack of information about Latin American attitudes as does the statement that the 19th century *pensador* Francisco Bilbao favored close bonds between the United States and Latin America.

The section urging caution lest we confuse nationalistic reform moves with communism is an altogether different matter. It is perceptive and convincing. The same is true of Perkins' explanation that a Marshall Plan would not be effective in Latin America. The author concludes that the Latin Americans are not willing to cooperate or to put their own houses in order to a degree sufficient to make a Marshall Plan work as it did in Europe. In the light of this realistic conclusion, it is difficult to understand why Perkins is so optimistic that the Latin Americans are now advancing steadily toward distributive justice and democracy.

On the whole, the book is so complacent in tone as to lead the reader to conclude that all is well South of the Border, that no revision in United States policies is called for. How many more Castros will it take?

FREDRICK B. PIKE

University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS RELIGION.

By Gordon Allport. Macmillan Paperbacks, New York. i, xi, 147 pp. \$1.25

Too few scholars have seriously and lengthily given their attention to the Psychology of Religion. In the present volume, Dr. Allport gives his effort to this area of rare endeavor.

"A man's religion," says the author-psychologist "is the audacious bid he makes to bind himself to creation and the Creator. It is his ultimate attempt to enlarge and to complete his own personality by finding the supreme context in which he rightly belongs." (At the outset the reader must fix firmly in his consciousness that the author

is dealing only with "subjective religion." At no time does he enter into the realm of objective religion apart from its subjective relevance. To miss this point would be to miss the main intent of the volume; to miss the cogency of the points to be understood.)

Tackling his analysis from a developmental point of view, Dr. Allport opens his discussion with a treatment of "Origins of the Religious Quest." Here it is contended that the subjective (personal) religious sentiments of mankind are very much alive at all times since their roots are many and deep. One gets the impression in this chapter that Allport would be at home in a discussion of the nature of man as it might be expressed in an Augustinian vocabulary.

While the author at no time expressly deals with the nature of man in a philosophical framework, he appears to sanction the ideology that man is indeed the proximate norm of morality, while God, "The Holy One," is the ultimate norm. Within this chapter the treatment of Culture and Conformity leads one to believe that the Allport point of view is akin to that of Christopher Dawson, especially in his *Religion and Culture*.

Persons responsible for the early religious formation of the young will find much enlightenment in the chapter, "The Religion of Youth."

Author Allport traces the first formations of the religious "temperament" in childhood and analyzes the transition into the turbulence of adolescence. From here the reader is brought up-to-date on the studies that have been done on college students in their religious experience. The jarring examples that are quoted from the research area on Veterans point up the complexity and intricacies of the task of religious formation.

In addressing himself to "The Religion of Maturity," the author stresses a theory which will be not all strange to the readers of Lindworsky in his treatment of the Vocational Ideal. Allport chooses the following description for his presentation of maturity in its three states. First, the avenue of widening interests (the expanding self); second, the avenue of detachment and insight (self-objectification) and, third, the avenue of integration (self-unification). It is in this third stage that the religion of maturity is formed. In this stage the mature

religious sentiment demands a comprehensive philosophy of life. Here, the thoughtful reader will find himself asking himself some searching questions. This, in the reviewer's opinion, is the highest praise that can be given the Allport work.

Many readers will find themselves unable perhaps to agree with some portions of the treatment of "Conscience and Mental Health"; however, at all times the reader will be stimulated to ask himself some questions that are long overdue.

The philosopher and theologian will have to remember constantly that Allport is a psychologist and treats "The Nature of Faith" in the *geist* of the psychologist-scientist.

The author concludes that every human being must seek his faith over a "solitary way." Here again, it must be recalled that Allport treats only of subjective religion.

TRAFFORD P. MAHER, S.J.
Saint Louis University

SOVIET ECONOMIC WARFARE. By Robert Loring Allen. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., x, 293 pp. \$5

This book essays a delineation of the Soviet economic war against the non-Communist nations, a war comprehending economic competition with the industrialized countries in the field of trade and penetration of selected underdeveloped countries of certain geo-strategic value by means of bilateral trade, generous loans, long-term credits and even outright gifts.

The opening chapter, in this reviewer's estimation, is the best. In these seven pages the author brilliantly summarizes the form and content of a Soviet offensive on the economic front enabling the Communists to take the initiative and press the non-Communist world wherever it is weakest. Few people realize the gravity of this economic struggle now taking place. The author quite properly says that this is the type of war which Moscow can win without ever firing a shot.

The bulk of the book analyzes the post-World War II trade and aid drive of the Soviet Union and its satellite empire. Given state trading and the economic and political motivation behind it, the author then measures the potential impact of Soviet world economic activities in terms of its importance to the Soviet Bloc itself and the Soviet abil-

ity to out-produce the industrialized countries.

The author examines at length selective trade with underdeveloped countries and, although the present position is one of expansion, he indicates that, in the long run, time is not necessarily on the Soviet Union's side.

Shipping thousands of tons of cement to Burma just before the monsoon arrived underlines Soviet inexperience; and in many other countries the inability of the Soviet Union to deliver goods of good quality when promised indicates that they have their own problems; indeed, the more they operate on a world plane, the more uncommitted nations can judge for themselves the value of Soviet promises in the light of poor performance.

It is a pity that, while Professor Allen is described as one of the outstanding authorities on Soviet economic relations in his country, he can write a book on Soviet economic warfare and never breathe a word about the basis of that war. There are three elements which he has completely missed:

1. Lenin's basic postulate that Communism will win world domination by increasing labor productivity. Lenin regarded war as a means of getting one capitalist nation to destroy another; but the brilliant Russian intellectual understood the very core of the problem when he linked heavy industrialization to increasing labor productivity as the very heart of the world revolution.

2. Stalin laid the basis for heavy industrialization in Russia. He picked the brains of the capitalist world for ideas and techniques and filled his factories with workers who had been stripped of all trade union rights; from that day to this, by various devices they have been whipped and driven to ever increasing productivity, the fruits of which are mainly re-invested by Moscow in bigger and better mass production sites.

3. He has ignored the brains of this world operation, which is the Comecon in Moscow. Founded in 1949 by Stalin, the Comecon's initial mission was the impressing of the Soviet pattern on the East European and Asian satellites. A series of explosions due to the economic distortion promoted by Moscow brought in 1953 a basic shift and a much more intelligent program comprehending the *division of labor* amongst all the elements of the Soviet empire, *specialization in production*, and an economic gen-

eral staff in Moscow which superintends *standardization* and *economic planning* within the Soviet empire. Outside it probes for the weak spots and recommends aids and credits and coordinates trade with the free world in the light of economic and political Soviet world ambitions. One might say that the Professor has written a book about labor without mentioning trade unions.

It is, nevertheless, well worth reading because it is thought-provoking.

The professional anti-Communists who will continue to cry that Communism will be defeated on the battlefield are dangerous and antique. The problem is not that we march towards war but rather that the Soviets hope to throttle the non-Communist world without giving any chance to those who believe in it to fire one shot in its defense.

R. L.-G. DEVERALL
Brussels

I LOOKED FOR GOD'S ABSENCE. By Irenaeus Rosier, O. Carm. (Tr. by Ilona Ricardo) Sheed and Ward, New York. vi, 231 pp. \$3.95

This startlingly-titled book reports an assault on a generally accepted thesis about religion in French life. In the last 20 years multiple studies have supplied a plethora of facts on the religious non-practice of the French working classes, suggesting the conclusion that they had largely abandoned Catholic Christianity. *La France, pays de mission?*, *Les 99 autres . . .*, and *Le mecanisme de la dechristianisation* are titles typical of studies supporting this conclusion. Father Rosier worked and lived with several communities of French miners to test whether not only Catholic religious practice is absent from their lives but also true religiousness basically continues. If God is somehow truly present in their lives, i.e., the true God of Christianity, then one might deny or at least question or qualify the claim of dechristianization despite lack of formal observance.

Father Rosier, Dutch Carmelite psychologist, used several months' participant observation and informal non-directive interviews in his qualitative research into the socio-religious facts already quantitatively reported. His writing sparkles with detailed observations and vividly personal recollec-

tions. He is alive to openings into men's minds and the stresses of their straining bodies, to the hum of technics and the intricacies of social relations, to the sequences of events and the localized expressions of status-seeking and the response to authority. He humbly recognizes the contrary views of more experienced participants in and observers of French workers' culture, particularly some quite knowledgeable priest-workers; yet he tightly holds to his conviction that God is indeed present in the hearts of the religiously non-practicing French workers.

I am not satisfied that Father Rosier has proved his point. There is no question of the genuineness of his experience nor would I challenge his facts. They parallel too closely my own as a worker in a German steel mill and as an observer in several mines. His record of discoveries and anxieties evoked almost exact recollections of my own. There were the same kindnesses, suspicions, propositions, loneliness—and maturing. But his evidence is not sufficient; nor is his interpretation compelling. Too much of the relatively brief book is taken up with the author's comings, goings and placement arrangements (although highly interesting), and far too little with his substantive inquiry. He should have given us far more case studies; he might also have indicated some statistical breakdown, no matter how rough, of the evidence supporting and not supporting his contention. His interpretation of the supporting facts which he did find is questionable. A vague, occasional reference to God, whether actually existing or hoped for, a God unacquainted with revelation, worship, prayer, sacraments, good works, precepts, community and Church, hardly manifests a Christian soul. The most that can be said, I think, at least as far as Father Rosier's evidence goes, and other studies and my own experience support, is that there is some indication that God has some meaning in the lives of some French workers other than those who practice their religion.

However, this book deserves to be read, both because it questions an important thesis and because it is a warm living document of a dedicated priest, a penetrating mind, and an experienced observer.

JOSEPH B. SCHUYLER, S.J.
Fordham University
Shrub Oak, New York

SELF-DEVELOPING AMERICA. By Harold J. Ruttenberg. Harper, New York. xiii, 254 pp. \$4.50

A bold and important but essentially simple idea is here dressed up in questionable philosophy and confusing symbolism.

I think that the author is right when he says: 1. that present patterns of collective bargaining are obsolete; 2. that the great creative potential of the work force is unexploited; 3. that giving employees opportunity to use their creative intelligences is important both from the economic and the human standpoint; 4. that management must take the lead in introducing changes into collective bargaining; 5. that it is extremely important to tie earnings to productivity, and also to the productivity of the individual firm; 6. that finding a formula for productivity is not as difficult as effecting change in labor-relations patterns.

I think that he is probably right in saying that a first and an essential condition of winning full cooperation of the workers is to assure them steady income. But here we come to the crux of the problem. Can management assume this risk? Of course, if all employers guaranteed earnings, consumption would hold up and so would employment. But what mechanism have we which would bring all employers simultaneously to guarantee earnings?

He is right that an all-out effort to aid undeveloped nations would spur the economy to full production, and that as these countries began to develop their expanding needs would cause a feedback of demand here. But I would like to see a more down-to-earth discussion of how to finance this program, or at least get it under way. This section leaves, I think, the key question unanswered. The problem turns in part on how much faith you have in the beneficial effect of deficit financing. There is also the question of how we would pay for the vast quantities of raw materials imported from abroad at a time when we are losing gold and the dollar is threatened because of an unfavorable balance of payments.

Here the author raises questions which deserve debate; I don't think he gives satisfactory much less conclusive answers. (Possibly technical assistance to other countries is of equal importance as mutual aid. Also, American capital is being exported in the form of investing in foreign and competing

companies. Will this feed back?) What effect such a program of vast aid to poorer countries would have on Soviet and Chinese policies is anybody's guess.

Mr. Ruttenberg's excursions into philosophy neither help this book nor show great proficiency in philosophy. His occasional references to theology show that he is no theologian. The book would have been more effective, if his propositions had been advanced with less literary millinery.

LEO C. BROWN, S.J.

THE END OF IDEOLOGY: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties. By Daniel Bell. Free Press, Glencoe, Ill. 416 pp. No price given.

Dan Bell is an unusual man. He has been, in the course of his varied and versatile life, a practicing Socialist and Social Democrat, a left-wing journalist, labor editor of *Fortune*, and a professor of sociology. The last seems to have won out over the others.

The End of Ideology is mainly a reworked collection of his articles and essays written originally for *The New Leader*, *Fortune*, *Commentary*, and scholarly journals.

The pieces illustrate the wide-ranging interests of Bell's mind and run the gamut from discussions of capitalism and Marxism to a pin-point report on racketeering on the New York waterfront to an explosion of the "myth of the Mafia" as a factor in American crime.

He describes his own perspective as "anti-ideological but not conservative." His thesis is that "we have witnessed, in the last decade, an exhaustion of 19th century ideologies, particularly Marxism, as intellectual systems that could claim truth for their views of the world What is left for the critic is the hardness of alienation, the sense of otherness. The claims of doubt are prior to the claims of faith."

This may be all right for the professor of sociology but unfortunately (or fortunately) most of us have to live in a world where the claims of faith are prior to the claims of doubt. Dan Bell has shuffled off the Marxist illusions of his youth and this is all to the good. But there is no need to assume that because Marxism failed him and his intellectual contemporaries that therefore all ideologies, all systems of thought, are equally bankrupt.

In the book's extensive index there are only about half a dozen names that I could identify as Catholic, or even Christian, and one of these is Father Coughlin. I had always thought that Jacques Maritain was one modern Catholic thinker who had been able to pierce the veil of prejudice on the part of secular intellectuals. It is a sobering thought to realize that as far as Bell is concerned Maritain doesn't exist and that there is no body of Christian thought that is worth mentioning outside of a bare reference to Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich.

So ideology is dead, is it? There is something wonderful, and irritating, about the arrogance of the left, including the ex-left. Granted that Bell defines ideology in the rather special sense of "the conversion of ideas into social levers." When he says, "What gives ideology its force is its passion," you can see that he is speaking primarily of left-wing, messianic, political ideology. Even so, there is more ideology in heaven and earth than is dreamt of in this philosophy.

There is also something irritating about the myopia of the sociologist toward things American. Bell knows all about the subject of "workers' control of industry," for example, as illustrated by the activities of the Guild Socialists and the shop stewards' movement in England, the workers' councils in Poland, the *comites d'entreprise* in France. But he either sees no connection, or is totally indifferent, when it comes to considering the implications of the CIO's Industry Council Plan or the Scanlon Plan for the whole question of workers' control. These American flora aren't worthy of mention. Granted they may not have the radical *elan* of *comites d'entreprise* and they aren't as hard to pronounce as *Mitsbestimmungsrecht*, but some of us just happen to think they might have a lot more value for the future of mankind and the welfare of the working class. At least they rate a word or two.

After all, the Scanlon Plan was immortalized by Russell Davenport in the pages of *Fortune* at the very time Bell was in charge of the labor department. And the Industry Council Plan was largely the product of the thinking of an ex-Socialist named John Brophy (who had read the encyclicals) and a great labor leader named Phil Murray. Remember him, Dan?

Despite a few little irritations of this kind, I found *The End of Ideology* highly readable, provocative and stimulating. Bell is indeed a rare bird for a sociologist. He is not only very bright; he knows how to write and he has had experience in the real world. These qualities alone make his book worth the price of admission. When he writes of Communism, he writes as one of the leaders of the anti-Communist caucus in the big New York local of the Newspaper Guild back in the 1940s when it was fashionable and safe to go along with the Stalinists. He is not simply a theorizer. I liked his treatment of the Harvard Business School man who had convinced himself that workers aren't really interested in money but that the demand for more dough conceals some craving much more mysterious and profound.

I liked it but I did not entirely agree with it. Money is important but it most certainly is not all. And it may be that the Business School man is on the right track in exploring the non-material incentives that impel, or *should* impel, the worker in the modern factory. It may be that Dan Bell has learned to see through Marx but is still bemused by the materialism that produced Marx.

JOHN C. CORT
Boston, Mass.

LAW AND CIVILIZATION. By Palmer D. Edmunds. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., xi, 528 pp. \$6

To advance recognition of the contribution that the rule of law can and must make in the establishment of order and stability in our shrinking world is indeed a worthwhile task. Organizations such as the American Bar Association's Committee on World Peace Through Law effectively work toward this end. So also do those individuals such as Prof. Edmunds who have set themselves to the task of reminding us of the rich legal legacy of the past, who would show us when, where, and in what ways law has emerged as a protector of man against arbitrary government and an upholder of human dignity.

In attempting to search out relevant sources of law the author examines the *Zeitgeist*, probing for history's testimony, that we might appreciate better the heritage of freedom under law available to us. Others

have examined significant contributions to the deposit of human experience considered as striving for justice and order. But usually these studies have been confined to a particular era, e.g., the solid scholarship exhibited by Lewis Hanke and the late Felix Cohen on the role of Spanish theologian-jurists in the struggle for justice in the new world or to one particular aspect, such as the stimulating studies of Brendan Brown on the development—and resurgence—of the philosophy of natural law. The author, however, takes the total consideration of human law for his theme, summarizing pertinent eras and aspects.

The book is divided into seven parts: Overview, Synthesis of Law and Government, Rome's Great Legacy, One God and the Law, Man His Own Lawmaker, Civilization Under the Common Law, and Epilogue. In a work of this ambitious scope some generalization is unavoidable; the book is not footnoted which lightens it for general reading but weighs heavily on the curiosity of a history student, since the listed source materials for some parts are extremely limited. In the chapter entitled Christianity and the Roman Catholic Church a traditional Protestant view of the social structure of the early Church is presented, John Huss accurately burns for the better part of a page but no mention is made of St. Thomas More, patron of lawyers. The common law as found in the United States is perceptively explained in an extensive breakdown by chapters and in the Epilogue a most interesting look is taken at the law-related activities of the United Nations.

FRANK B. HIGGINS, S.J.
Weston College
Weston, Mass.

POLITICAL SCIENCE: A Philosophical Analysis. By Vernon Van Dyke. Stanford University Press, Stanford. xi, 235 pp. \$5

As one with graduate training in political science, who has often believed that his own academic training in that subject neglected its methodology, I welcomed the opportunity to read and reflect on this book. It was hoped that what the science and methodology of history can do for students of history would now become available for younger and even older political scientists. Perhaps my experiences in historical meth-

odology led me to expect too much from an analogous work in political science.

This book is more than knee-deep in distinctions, as it sets forth the object, the functions, the approaches, the methods, and the scientific quality of political science. In the matter of approaches, there are over 20 set forth and some of these have sub-divisions. In the course of his discussion of the power approach, the author writes: "Discussions of international politics not infrequently include rather long lists of the elements of power, the elements sometimes being grouped in a strained fashion into categories called tangible and intangible." I found it hard not to write in the margin at this point that this adverse judgment of the author on others was amply true of his own presentation. One might abide these rather endless and at times exotic distinctions and groupings if their contribution to the work of political science was shown.

If the author did not believe in the compatibility of objectivity and conclusions, one might understand but not approve these myriad distinctions which catalogue without clarifying the purported objectives of the book. But the author explicitly asserts that objectivity should not be defined in a way that precludes answers of conclusions on the score that facts speak for themselves. This heartening view, however, is dampened by a presentation that is so largely a collection of distinctions along with a considerable avoidance of judgment.

Chapter III, which deals with the explanatory and predictive functions of political science is, however, well worth reading. Explanation requires the political scientist to know the relationship between thought and action, means and end, causes and effects, conditions and consequences. While explanation of political matters satisfies intellectual curiosity and is a way of occupying and improving the mind, the author does not believe it should exhaust the task of the political scientist. Rational choices are to be made or proposed among competing courses of political actions. This function is called the predictive one. One might quarrel with the word but the idea expressed is surely one that political scientists must face. It is often said that not enough of any variety of teacher instructs his students in decision making. If readers of this book would ponder over this facet of the discussion, the volume would be worthwhile.

There are throughout the book some wry and curious remarks which are not always well elaborated. There is the observation that the sub-division of political science known as comparative government is often little more than the bound-in-one-volume disparate description of two or more governmental structures with little or no comparisons. There is the frequently reiterated remark that it is more important to raise significant questions for explanation and answers rather than to worry about theoretically preferable approaches to insignificant topics. There is the rather pervasive view that all law (common, coded, or constitutional) is positive and that concepts such as justice are purely subjective. It is such a view that seems to preclude the normative as one of the acceptable functions of political science.

JAMES L. BURKE, S.J.
Jesuit Educational Association
Boston, Mass.

THE EMERGING STATES OF FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA. By Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. Stanford University Press, xii, 595 pp., \$8.75

Former French Equatorial Africa consists of the four nations of Gabon, the Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Chad, and the Central African Republic. The latter three are joined in a loose confederation from which their wealthier neighbor, Gabon, has largely held aloof. With a total population of only five million persons these four countries were even less developed under French colonial rule than was their sister federation of French West Africa.

This new work, by a husband and wife team of American scholars, is the definitive book on this little-known area and covers every aspect of life from telecommunications to religion. Though better organized than the authors' previous volume on French West Africa, it still suffers from the inevitable curse of all books of this nature—the difficulty of dealing with one's subject matter simultaneously on the territorial, functional, and chronological levels. Because of its size and wealth of detail this is a book for scholarly or reference purposes rather than for the general reader. One factor beyond the authors' control is the fact that, since the completion of their research in November 1959, much of their

detailed material has been rendered out-of-date by the swift pace of events in Africa. However, this work will remain the standard point of departure for study of this area for many years to come.

VICTOR C. FERKISS
St. Mary's College of California

THE MISSIONARY'S ROLE IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BETTERMENT. Edited by John J. Considine, M.M., Newman Press, Westminster, Md. 330 pp. \$1.75

Conference reports often turn out to be pretty trite material. But this volume, resulting from a five-day conference held Easter week of 1958 under joint sponsorship of the Catholic International Rural Life Conference and Fordham University's Institute of Mission Studies, is exceptionally useful.

The scope of the conference was, first, to urge upon missionaries the conviction that, beyond their directly apostolic work, they have an active role to play in improving the social and economic conditions of the people among whom they work, whether these be Catholics or not. Presuming this responsibility, the conferees, all persons of large missionary experience, charted guiding lines to help other missionaries confront their responsibility.

Some chapter headings will suffice to indicate the imaginative approach of the conferees: "Cooperatives to Build Character and the Economy;" "Building a Strong Rural Community;" "How Well Do We Know Our Local Culture?" and "The Missionary and the Worker."

To the more conservative mind it may appear revolutionary that missionaries should have any concern with economic conditions. Missionary orders of long experience, however, are united in agreeing that future mission work must not neglect this vital aspect of the Church's role in underdeveloped countries. For the missionary without formal social or economic education I cannot imagine a volume that will provide a finer understanding of the real possibilities that lie at hand. The book also contains useful bibliographies on all the topics treated.

PHILIP LAND, S.J.
Institute of Social Sciences
Gregorian University, Rome

SOCIAL ORDER

Letters

"Political Science Today"

Professor Hallowell has written an admirable survey of the present state of political science and the resulting tendencies of self-destruction in his "Political Science Today" in your March issue. You are to be congratulated on publishing this piece which should be obligatory reading in all introductory political theory courses.

Allow me to add a few points for emphasis on the central issue of the time which Hallowell, rightly, has defined in these words: "Is reality something to which ultimately all of us must conform, or is it something we make to conform to our desires?" This issue has a great deal to do with the problem of the scientific method which we consider appropriate to the problems of man; for if we should insist that man is to be the object of the same methods by which we approach nature, we will treat him as a piece of nature and use him for our ends.

As he refers to Aristotle's *Politics* as an "inquiry" and uses the term "science" only for what is presently taught under that name on American campuses, Hallowell creates an impression that there has been no political science before Comte. Of course, the exact opposite is true: there has been no more political science after Comte, except for the contemporary attempts to reconstruct a new science of politics by Voegelin and others. Hallowell shows in the course of his article that he, too, regards the so-called political "science" of today's positivists as an ideological falsification with dangerous practical consequences.

What is the difference between true political science and today's pseudo-scientific ideologies?

There are basically two methods of knowledge. The world of natural phenomena is known only by observation from without. We cannot penetrate into the experiences of a tree, beetle, or an electron, if an electron has experiences (and why shouldn't it?). In the case of man, how-

ever, there is a part—the only such part—of the universe which we experience from within. Illumination from within is therefore the proper approach to the knowledge of man's problems. Knowledge of natural phenomena is obtained by description, quantification, measurement, classification. Its object is prediction and manipulative control. Knowledge of man is knowledge of the experiences of participation in a reality that transcends the individual person and the immanent world of nature. The data of this knowledge are the typical experiences of human life, its method is philosophical interpretation, its object not prediction but orientation. Illumination of man's typical experiences from within has been the substance of the *episteme politike*, the knowledge of human order that has served to guide man's public actions and public existence. Illumination from within is thus the proper method of political science; phenomenal observation from without the method proper to the knowledge of natural phenomena. Those who attempt to elevate the method of natural science to the exclusive criterion of all science—an attempt that goes back to Descartes—not merely deny that there is a genuine political science but also deny that there is a human soul, a transcendent realm of being, and a human order grounded in man's participation in transcendence.

The positivists claim that all of life is world-immanent and give to their rejection of life's transcendent dimensions the appearance of "scientific" objectivity. Actually, this position is itself a bit of metaphysics. I cannot, therefore, agree with Hallowell when he says that in modern political "science" history has replaced metaphysics. Not history, but bad, uncritical, ideological metaphysics has replaced rational, critical and philosophical metaphysics. It is the surreptitious metaphysics that refuses to come out in open discussion which explains the totalitarian inclinations of modern positivists, behaviorists, progressivists, and other ideologists. Comte made his positivism into a regular cult, replete

with prayers, litanies, and adorations. His contemporary co-religionists worship the idols of immanence no less for not falling on their knees in public. The first requirement of political sanity today is therefore to deny the name of "science" to the unphilosophical approach to politics and to restore the Platonic-Aristotelian *episteme politike* to its rightful methodological preeminence.

If America has created a sound political order, it is because the founders and teachers of this country knew how to relate politics to true philosophical knowledge of man. At present, this original sound sense of order has been overlaid by ideologies. Communism and Nazism are merely the most militant, but by no means the sole contemporary ideologies. Other ideologies have taken possession of our universities, from where they exercise a disorienting and decomposing influence on American minds. They have opposed and attacked the foundations on which public order has been based, in this country as well as in Europe. They have substituted "crusades" and "mobilizations" for judicial government action. They have broken down the common framework of discussion in our society, so that power pressure has become the most widely used method not only in politics but also in our universities. The first order of the day is therefore a recovery of sound political theory.

Your periodical, by publishing Professor Hallowell's article, has made a real contribution to this end.

GERHART NIEMEYER

University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana

Professor Hallowell not only treats a voluminous amount of pertinent literature but calls the reader's attention to some of the most significant problems which confront the discipline of political science today.

Professor Hallowell clearly reveals the error and shortcomings introduced by an overdose of positivism and scientism. The political scientist's preoccupation with scientific sampling and measurement, the construction of analytical models and political behavior research in general has ignored the fact that man has a spiritual side which

may not always be measurable or predictable. Such research reveals how man has reacted, is reacting and how he will probably react but does not tell us how he ought to react. Computers and samplings are helpful in learning about the reactions of our fellowman but do little to offer concrete values and a framework by which man may form his political objectives. This is nowhere more evident than in the lack of clear cut, immutable, long-range objectives to be found in the foreign policy of the United States at the moment.

Such modern and diverse thinkers as Strauss, Voegelin, Niebuhr, and Hallowell himself, who are concerned with man's moral being and destiny, who try to concern themselves not only with what is, but what ought to be, offer a fresh new hope in the attempt of man to regain a more integrated or teleological concept of his political life.

ROBERT E. CLUTE

University of Nevada,
Reno, Nevada

Congratulations on your inclusion of John Hallowell's article, "Political Science Today," in the March issue of *Social Order*. This essay, by one of America's important political philosophers, will join the ranks of the half-dozen or so incisive commentaries on the present condition of Aristotle's favorite subject.

Professor Hallowell is one of a small number of modern political scientists, including Eric Voegelin, David Easton, and Dwight Waldo, who devotes critical-creative energy to examining the state of political science. He is one of an even smaller group of lay Christian political philosophers and surely is to be included along with Jacques Maritain and Reinhold Niebuhr (perhaps somewhere between these two) in any list of important Christian political commentators. The pity is that Dr. Hallowell does not write more often than he does. It has been much too long since his classic, *The Moral Foundation of Democracy*, and his widely used *Main Currents of Modern Political Thought*. A great deal has happened in political science which needs his professional scrutiny.

As his article in *Social Order* so well reflects, Professor Hallowell's concern goes

straight to the central problem in modern political science—the forced and false distinction between fact and value, and the degradation of the latter as being outside the purview of “truly rational” discourse. Most students of politics are aware that the preponderance of creative talent in the discipline is engaged in description and categorization of political phenomenon. For the political behaviorist the only legitimate rational exercise is the creation of “analytical-constructs” in order to describe and categorize “facts.” An idea (value) is never more than a reflection of some empirically demonstrable determinant, be it an economic drive, a social striving, a psychological impulse or an historical current. Excepting the supposedly ennobling hope of prediction, the discovery and description of these determinants in an actual decision-making setting (behavior) is the sole function of reason. Hallowell has described this appropriation of the rational faculty as a revolt against reason.

Of course, one need not be a Christian thinker to protest the sterility and internal confusion of attempts to separate the idea from the fact, the ideal from the real. Still, it is revealing about Christianity that certain of its professors have been in the vanguard of those protesting such separation. Hallowell echoes St. Thomas Aquinas and the 16th century Anglican Divine, Richard Hooker, in his reaction against threats to that perfect unity of idea and “fact” in the Incarnate God. In lucid modern language, Professor Hallowell expresses anew the scholastic rejection of nominalist, positivist and always potentially nihilist strains present in any excessive emphasis on the flesh-fact as more significantly rational than and/or separate from the word-value.

There are many of us laboring in the modern liberal arts version of Aristotle's vineyard who have long since wearied of social-science oriented interdisciplinary projects, “value-free” encounters with trivia and other manifestations of positivist ascendancy in the discipline of political science. We welcome Professor Hallowell's return to print and hope that this essay marks his return to the lists.

PHILIP B. SECOR

Dickinson College
Carlisle, Pa.

I particularly appreciate the opportunity of reading Professor Hallowell's article, which raised questions that had not earlier occurred to me.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON

The Rockefeller Foundation
New York City

An amen to Professor Hallowell's spirit of real search. But . . .

That “every conception of justice is historically relative” does not necessarily entail that there is no justice. That ancient astronomers thought the sun revolved around the earth and that we think the opposite does not mean that there is no motion at all. Our conceptions of justice may become more profound but, being human, will remain imperfect. The revelations of God are subject to our interpretations; it is why we are not gods. We may very well know what justice is, but to assume that we do is a dangerous vanity. For man to “know” what justice is is as much a fallacy as to “know” there is none, even though he may be right. For to misunderstand in so important an issue is worse than not to understand. It is indeed our task to conform our souls to reality, but we will not know that reality on earth however sure we are. This is why “progress” has not answered the ultimate question, and why we must not impose on answers the limitation of our certainty. Modern science, as Professor Hallowell points out, has simply rephrased the question—which is another kind of limitation. The questions we ask determine the answers we find. And so we must not be afraid to ask the question of Justice (Good, the nature of Man, etc.)—and what demands even greater courage—we must not be afraid to accept mystery (signs and symbols) as the only possible present answers. Most of all, this is not merely an academic problem, for if we cease to ask we deny ourselves the possibility of being answered, and man does indeed disappear into a chemical being. The contemporary tragedy is that men have become too certainty-centered (not only scientifically) and have closed themselves to anything inscrutable. Back then to Plato's questions, but not expecting to grasp all, remembering that it

was the insatiable pride of reason which led men to the answer of today, and not denying a "nature of things" simply because we cannot name it. Rather Professor Hallowell's approach with reason, but tempered with the humility of an open soul.

(Mrs.) THOMAS D. HILL, JR.
Cambridge 38, Mass.

"Coal Industry— The Leader"

I protest the naivete of Father Killeen's article on "Coal Industry—The Leader" (January, SO). The hundreds of thousands of miners living on Government food packages in your country stands as a monumental blotch on the American Enterprise system, and on the dominant values of your society.

Why not cooperate, if the major industrial interests agree on the matter of getting rid of the "human expendables" that interfere with economic efficiency as your realists of a sensate culture define it.

On the other hand, Father Neenan's article on "Catholics and the Temporal Order" in the March issue was a gem.

(REV.) A. HOGAN

St. Francis Xavier University
Sydney, N. S.
Canada

Disavowal

I am sure that none of SOCIAL ORDER's knowledgeable readers has been waiting on the brink of indecision for me to write that the Cuban government has joined the Communist bloc. The evidence of the past year has made this saddening development altogether too clear, though I think it is still far from being a settled matter as to why and how this unfortunate turn of events should have come to pass—the testimony of ex-ambassadors and the howling of certain newspaper columnists notwithstanding. To push the currently resurrected "betrayal in the State Department" line would probably be, in the long run, as

detrimental to our own interests as it is, I think, erroneous. In any case, the "forecast" I made in my article on Cuba last year in the March SOCIAL ORDER became so obviously obsolete that I did not really feel it needed explicit retraction.

Two things, then, prompt the present letter. On the basis of recent interviews with Cuban exiles of unquestioned integrity and competence—one of them an economist of international reputation who was a top official in the Castro government until last spring—I have come to the opinion that

1. our government's position was far more conciliatory and commendable than it appeared to be and

2. Communist influence was already in a strategically controlling position at the time I wrote the article, even though this was not yet apparent to "outside" observers attempting to assess the Cuban situation on an objective basis. Hence, the article was, unintentionally, inaccurate on a critical political point. (I would still maintain, however, that despite its political errors, it was substantially correct in its economic evaluation as well as in other respects.)

Secondly, there is some indication that reprints of the article (duly authorized over a year ago) are still being circulated by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, even though it is patent that in the current context the article could only convey a dangerously misleading impression of Cuba. Indeed, possibly this is the motivation behind such distribution. Whatever the circumstances, such action necessitates, I think, this public disavowal.

In closing, may I suggest that perhaps in the long run we shall all owe Dr. Castro a debt of gratitude after all? It is being realistic rather than merely cynical to see a causal connection between the Cuban tragedy and the promising proposals made by Mr. Dillon at Bogota last September and elaborated so effectively in March by the Kennedy Administration. By forcing us to a frank realization of our sins of commission and omission, Dr. Castro may unwittingly have saved most of Latin America, and us, from a massive re-enactment of the Communist subversion in Cuba.

WILLIAM P. GLADE

University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin

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